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M1rnonAN1>u~r. - A Jetter, addressee! "To the People or Massnchusctts," in the
course or the canvass for the election of State officers, in October last, conlnincd
th~e paragraphs, to wit:" A few days afler the People's Con\'ention in Faneuil Hall, the Rtterend R. :\I.
Dexter deli\'ered one of what is called the Frnternity Lectures. These lectures call
together the more e·ager und ultra of the fanntics ~f .Ma~sncbusette. Senators and
Repre•cntatives attend. I pniy ~·ou to mark the name 'F,·aler,1ity,' and then to
recall, or, if the circumstances are not fresh in your memory, to rend some account
of the Rlrocitics commitled under the name of 'Fraternity' in the French ReYolution. The re,•erend gentleman, I bclie,·c, is one or that class or ' nil-sufficient, sclfsufficient, in~ufficient' cleri:ymen, who not only think thnt they know more of Constitutional law thau William Pinkney and Daniel Webster c,·er did, but who also
evince a strong belief thnt they know more than God does -that they could create
a better world than He hns ma.de- and could govern the present one, bad as it is,
better than He does; nnd they, of coarse, aftilinte with t hose who want 'an antisln\'ery Bible, and an anti-sla\"ery God.'
" I need hardly say t hat I respect and reverence the clergyman who gives evidence
t hat bo duly appreciates the high and holy nature of bis mission. And l do not deny
to him the right, nt the proper time and in the proper manner, of discussing important political principles. But when a clergyman assumes to know more of Constitutional law than thos<1 who have spent their Jives in the inv~stigntion of its principle~,
be is npt to exhibit himself ns an unmitigated ass; and when he makes a political
prostitute of himself, pandering to tho lusts of a political party, be is entitled to no
grentet respect than - other persons who disregard their dnties. IlnrdJy so much,
as tho iniquity he commits may be more extensively pernicious.
" Oij tbe occasion of t his Fratern ity lecture, 'The Daily Advertiser' reports thnt
the re,·erend gentleman 'spoke of tho People's pnrty in terms of contempt,' and snid,
' The eod of the People's party would be a rope's end, as it would of all who strove
to thwart the onwnrd march of liberty.' Perhaps His Reverence will begin to think
t hat this was a mere jest of his; but such jests in revolutionury ti mes are npt by nnd
by to smack very much of earnest. It might be regarded as an ebullition of the
spleen of a fanatic, were it not that it bas been followed up by other significant utterances from higher quarters."
J\lr. Dexter thereupon addressed a letter lo tho writer, in "The Congregationalist,"
to which the first Jetter in this collection is a re1>ly. The others have followed for tho
reasons mdicnted in them.
Although some portion of the contents is of temporary interest only, the discussions respecting the Constitutional Rolntions of the States and the United States, and
the powers of tho President, are not of that chnrncter; and tho importnnce of these
topics may sen•e to justify a compliance with the wisbes which ha Ye been expressed,
that the letters should be published in their present form. They appeared originally
i n " The Boston Post.•·
CA,i BRIDGE,

Ft.bruary 20th, 1868.

•
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LETTER S .

TO THE REV. HENRY 1\f. DEXTER,

.Editor of The Congregationalist, Pastor of.the Berkley Street Church,
Fraternity Lecturer, ~c., ~c.
No. 1.

Srn, - I am i n the receipt of that compound mixture of
political piety and partisan politics, " The Congregationalist" of the 7th instant, containing your letter to me, dated
on the 3d.
If you entertain a supposition that my reference to you, in
the letter which I lately addressed "to the People of Massachusetts," was written in " hasty wrath," or indicated any
"loss of temper,:' I beg of you to disabuse your mind of that
idea with all possible expedition. -You may rest assured
that all which was there said was a deliberate, well•considered utterance, of the propriety of which I was then fully
persuaded, and have not since entertained a particle of
doubt; and I am too old to give any hope that I shall live
to repent.
I designed to strike at an offence which has been committed too often, and at an evil which has existed too long
without any sufficient rebuke; and that you presented yourself as a representative of the offenders to receive t he blow,
you may thank your Fraternity ledture.
The offence to which I refer is that committed by a
certain class of clergymen who assu me, in their public
discourses and writings, not only to settle, ex cathedra,
questions of Constitutional 1a,.,v, as if they were the final
expounders of the construction of the Constitution, but who
have the superlative impudence which leads them to sneer

4

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND

at the op1mons of Daniel Webster and Judge Curtis on
Constitutional questions. This is not only an offence
against good manners, but it becomes an evil, by giving
rise to new and unfounded dogmas, to false reasonings and
conclusions, and to loose Constitutional notiQPs 1n the community, at a time when there should be no tampering with
our Constitutional rights and duties. I know you only as
one of these offenders, and deal with you accordingly. You
are, it seems, prominent among them, and a suitable representative, therefore, through and by whom a proper admonition
may be given. As to the manner of administering the rebuke,
your taste and mine may differ. I have only to say, that it
was intended to be conveyed in terms which would fitly express my ideas on the subject, and in a manner which would
represent, precisely, the exhibition which that class of clergymen seem to make of themselves. You have appropriated
what 1 said of the class, as if I had said it of yourself, personally. I acquiesce in the propriety of the appropriation.
You have also appropriated a part of my remarks which
neither specified you nor the class. For that I am not responsible. It was Gerrit Smith, and not you, who said,
"Let the Constitution go, and save the country." Others
have made use of similar language.
'Phe occasion ;f my reference to you, and the class, was
the report of your Fraternity lecture. My reference ~as only
to the report in " The Daily Advertiser." Another report repre:
sented you as saying, substantially, that there was no doubt
that the President had a Constitutional right to issue the
Proclamation ; and t he general tenor of still another left no
reasonable doubt, that whatever might have been your precise
language, you were correctly reported in substance. Your
previous course confirmed the report.
You seem to imply, rather than to assert, that I acted on
insufficient evidence, thus impugning the report of the Daily
Advertiser. The two points presented by that report were,
that you "spoke of the People's party with contempt," and
that you represented that " the end of the People's party
would be a rope's end, as it would of all who strove to
thwart the onward march of liberty." Now, Sir, permit me
to say, that so far as you give a report of your lecture, you

UNCONSTITUTIONAL DIVINITY.

5

fully confirm the faithfulness of the report of the Advertiser.
You say that you " had been discussing the so-called P eople's party, and the possibility that they might not sustain
the President's emancipation policy." In what terms of
contempt you spoke of the P eople's party in that discussion,
you do not please to inform us; but I understand. t hat you
are t!Je editor of the Congregationalist, and in an editorial
article contained i n the number before me is this passage :
"In these elections, then, [the Fall elections,] as things now are,
we repeat it, the rebellion reaches its climax. If the Peopl1/s party
in . Massachusetts with its cordial, though in justice be it conceded
more rascally compeers in N ew York -and elsewhere, can succeed,
there is every probability that the South will triumph and subjugate a
divided North. If the party of the Government succeed, this movement of treason through the North will l>e reouked," &c.

The italics are mine. They serve to point to the characteristics bestowed upon the P eople's party. You are presumed to understand somewhat of t he force of language,
and to know, therefore, t hat this extract contains an implied
assertion of the positive rasc:1lity of the P eople's party in
Massachusetts. Their compeers in New York, and else•
where, are only "more rascally." The whole movement is
characterized as one of "treason." This surely expresses
something stronger than contempt, and leads to a reasonable
belief that in your discussion you at least verified the report.
What excuse have you for thus becoming " a political prostitute?"
As respects the other part of t he report, w e have your
remarks verbatim; given, you say, as if in answer to an objector,·who is made to remark : "And so you think there is
danger, do you, that the P eople's party will not sustain the
President- who is tlie Government ? " And " What will
the end be?" To which imaginary questions you ans~er :
" Be? When you get to it, it will be a rope's end for them,
or for anybody else who shall really and persistently attempt
to thwart t he onward march of liberty AND LAW." The italics
and capitals are yours. The latter I suppose for t he purpose of showing emphatically t he addition which you made
to what was reported in the Advertiser. The dra~atic char1•
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acter which you saw fit to give to the passage is not material. The "rope's end," as the end of the People's party, is
there, significantly, and for anybody else who shall really
and persistently attempt "to thwart the onward march of
liberty." Admit that you added "AND LAW," which you
place in small capitals, as if that addition made an essential
difference. Under some circumstances, and in some connections, it might do so. But what LAW do y<nt refer to? Why,
of course, to your law -your emancipation proclamation
law. It is the onward march of that law, and the liberty
connected with that law, of which you are speaking. That
is the law that is "marching on"; not the law as expounded
by jurists and commentators and courts of law. Law of this
last description is not generally spoken of as having an "onward march." You are of opinion, are you not, that that
law, like Gen. McClellan, is rather slow. You are not speaking of the law as expounded by any one who does not
believe in that " higher law)' which has lately been set up,
practically, as above even God's law. H aving faith in the
opinions of clergymen competent to decide, I conclude that
God has not seen fit to prescr.ibe the rules of municipal law
for the people of the United States; and that Jesus Christ
has not done so; that the teachings of the"Bible, to us, are
personal, not municipal, nor political. It h11s remained for
other clergymen to set up those teachings as a higher rnzinicipal and political rule than the written Constitution ; and if
the matter were merely speculative I might leave it to be
settled by the clergy. But when the latter class, usurping
God's authority, undertake to overrule the Constitution by
the assertion of this higher political law-when they thereby
inculcate unsound doctrine, not only in politics but in morals
-when they endeavor to make the people, instead of a lawabiding, a law-breaking community, - and insist that the
war shall be conducted on a basis which will greatly endanger, if not assuredly defeat its success, - it is quite time
that they should be exposed, as the " all-sufficient, self-suf•
ficient," persons, which they make themselves, and the " insufficient" personages which they really are. If any of them
have D. D. attached to their names, that does not disqualify
them from being also A S S, and mischief-makers beside~.
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You will say, perhaps, that it is undignified, to speak thus
of dignitaries. I am almost inclined to admit it. But when
one is striving to abate a nuisance, one must not stand on
his dignity.
So much for the character of the charge, the proof of the
facts on which it was founded, and the manner in which it
was stated.
And now let me thank you for having kindly furnished, in
the columns of your paper, full proof of the truth of the
prominent characteristics wnich I attributed to the class of
clergymen to which you seem to belong.
The remainder of your quotation from your Fraternity
'lecture not only shows, still further, your assumption of a
superior knowledge of Constitutional law, but the mode in
which you exhibit and prove that knowledge. It is in these
words:" These • P eople's party• men, some of them, are old men now,
but they will all live to see the day ;vhen - if they are loyal - they
will repent in dust and ashes of this attempt at a flank movement; to
see that there can be now but two honest parties in this land - they
who maintain the Constitution and the Government with entire fealty,
and with all their heart~, and they who, traitors at heart, desire their
overthrow. Those few men who do honestly think that the President
has gone beyond his power, will revi~e their judgment in the further
light of events. They may be trusted at last, to reach the dcci~iou
which Patrick Henry reached at first, and announced in the Virginia
Convention of '88, when he predicted that the time would come wJ1en
Congress would search the Constitution to see ' if they have power of
manumission. And have they not, Sir? Have they not power to
provide for the general defence and welfare ? May they not think
that these call fo1· the abolition of slavery? May they not pronounce
all slaves free, and will they not he warranted by that power ? This
is no ambiguous implication, or logical deduction. The Constitution
speaks to the point; they have the power, in clear, unequivocal terms,
and will clearly and certainly exercise it.'" - [Elliot, Debates of
Virginia, vol. iii. 590.J
•

You subjoin: " Tltis is what I said," and you close with
these words, addressed to me:" If you cannot say it-so
much the worse for you."
• Now, Sir, before examining your law, let me ask : Did

•

8

CONSTITUTIONAL L.AW .AND

you or did you not, in thus speaking of the action of the
" People's party men," as "this attempt at a flank movement,"
intend to imply that the rebellion was the movement in front,
in aid of which this movement in Massachusetts was an
attack upon the flank of the Government, and thus to give
significance to your talk about "treason " and the "rope's
end?"
And now, let us examine, with reference to its law, what
you thus said, and what it is so much the worse for me if I
cannot say.
In the first place there is the implication that you have
settled the Constitutional right of the President to issue a ,
proclamation emancipating all the slaves. Those men who
" honestly" differ from you " will repent in dust and ashes,"
and "revise their judgment in the further light of events."
What these " events" are, which will give the benefit of a
Drummond light upon Constitutional construction, you do
not say. But in this revision and reversal of opinion, through
and by which they are to believe that the President has not
gone beyond his Constitutional authority, they are to reach
the decision which Patrick Henry reached, and which you
quote from his speech. It may be presumed from the citation of volume and page, that you had seen the book, and
that you know that Patrick H enry was, in the Virginia Convention, an earnest opposer of the adoption of the F ederal
Constitution, - that he used all the arguments which he
could array, (not to say, conjured up all the bugbears which
he could summon,) in order to create a jealousy of the powers proposed to be conferred on the new Government to be
created by it. You should be presumed to have read some
of the pages immediately following your extract, in which
this very doctrine was denied by Governor Randolph ; and
to know, that notwithstanding the jealousy of Virginia for
State rights, and notwithstanding Mr. H enry's opposition,
the Constitution was adopted by t hat Convention, (which,
by the way, it never would have been if his speech quoted
by you qad been supposed to give a true construction,) and
you must also be presumed to know that this construction
was not only thus substantially overruled at the time, but
that it has never been received as sound from that day to
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this; and that for a quarter of a century, more or less, no
one, with any reasonable pretension of a right to be outside
of an insane hospital, has attempted to sustain any such
doctrine.
Furthermore: You adduce this extract to support your
opinion that the President has a right under the war-power
to emancipate by proclamation, whereas the right which
Patrick Henry asserted, supposing it to exist, would be in no
way dependent upon the existence of a war, and by the explipit language which you have quoted, it appears that he
asserted the right to be in Congress. There is not in the
whole passage a single word which in the most remote degree asserts any right or power of the President in relation
to the matter. You place his assertion, "'l'HEY HAVE THE
POWER," in capitals, at the same time that you produce the
extract to prove your Constitutional conclusion that the President has it. This is a specimen of your Constitutional law,
and your Constitutional arguments. It certainly appears that
you have not sufficient knowledge of legal Constitutional
principles to perceive that the extract upon which you rely,
if it were worth anything, would disprove your theory, by
showing that Congress had the power, and not the President. This is the stuff which you retail in Fraternity lectures, and it is on opinions thus formed, and thus sustained,
that, in another editorial, in the same paper, you have the
effrontery to misrepresent and slander other men, after this
fashion:-

•

•

" An attempt is making in various quarters to weaken the popular
enthusiasm in the position assumed by the President in his emancipation proclamation, by arguing that he lacked the Constitutional power
to issue it; and, in fact, to undermine the people's confidence in all
the war-measures, on the ground that the rebels ha,·e some vague
Constitutional rights which somehow hamper us ln all our attempts to
subjugate them, while there is nothing in the same Constitution which
in any manner interferes with their plans to subjugate us. We are
sorry to see some eminent men lending the weight of their names to
the emission of such direful folly and treason. And we ha,·e been
much astonished to find Mr. Justice Curtis writing a pamphlet to aid
and comfort the rebels, by pushing, with all bis might, such heresies."

·And then, with consummate arrogance, you speak of "the
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mournful fallacies of the unfortunate Judge." This is said
of Judge Curtis, a gentleman known .throughout the country,
and abroad, as one of the most distinguished jurists in America. There is no court in the country, which bas any regard
for its own character, which would not listen with ·profound ·
respect to the arguments of Judge Curtis. The Supreme
Court of Massachusetts hearkens to no one of the able advocates who throng the bar of that court, with greater attention than to Judge Curtis. The Supreme Court of the United
States pays a similar tribute to his merits. You yourself
could laud his judicial learning and wisdom, when his most
able dissenting opinion in the Dred Scott case was promulgated, the conclusion of which you could comprehend, although you were incapable of estimating the course of legal
reasoning through and by which he arrived at the result.
But now, when his legal opinion does not square with your
self-sufficient notions of Constitutional law, formed on no
legal basis, yoi.i can misrepresent the course and tendency of
his argument, affect to lament the "direful folly and treason,, of eminent men, express your astonishment to find
him " writing a pamphlet to aid and comfort the rebels," and
talk of "the mournful fallacies of the unfortunate Judge."
What right have you to expect that reasonable people will
write to, or of you with any expressions of respect, when
you are in the habit of speaking in terms similar to those
above quoted of the legal arguments and opinions of all persons from whom you, in the superlative eminence of your
legal lore, choose to differ?
I trust that you have enough of a sense of shame yet left
to make your cheeks tingle as you read this exposure· of your
utter incapacity to deal with a grave Constitutional question,
and of the effrontery of your assumption of a right to sit in
judgment upon the legal opinions of Judge Curtis, and to
talk of his mournful fallacies. If this is not "pandering to
the lusts of a political party," I am at a loss where to look
for an example of it.
This impudent assumption, by clergymen, of a knowledge
of Con.stitutional law, superior to, and entitling them to overrule the opinions of those who have been educated to the
profession, is a nuisance, which has existed quite too long

•
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upon sufferance; but when it is coupled with denunciations
of all lawyers who express opinions different from. those of
such clerical experts, as "trai tors," "•disloyal," "guerillas of
Jeff. Davis," "giving aid and comfort to the enemy," the
nuisance becomes intolerable, and I design to exert my humble efforts to abate it, in aid of which purpose I invite your
further correspondence.
" Suum cuique," as you say.
" With due respect," also.
,CAMl3nIDGE,

Nov. 11, 1862.

TO THE REV. HENRY M. DEXTER.
No. 2.

Sm, - I was desirous of seeing what justification or
excuse you might be disposed to give for your assumption
of a right to pronounce judgment upon questions of Constitutional law, upon lawyers and their opinions, and upon the
participators in the People's movement in the late election,
branding them, so far as you could, as traitors giving aid to
the rebels; and, especially, I wished to be advised by what
process of reasoning you would support your position that
the President had the power, by proclamation, to emancipate all the slaves in the States where ordinances of Secession have been adopted, and therefore solicited your further
correspondence. You favor me with your reply of the 18th
inst., and at the same time decline the honor, from which I
understand that this is the last communication with which
you will favor me. I am inclined not to regret it, because
in relation to yourself there is probably little further to be
said beyond what may be said at the present time.
My design in the paragraph which has given rise to this
correspondence, and in my part of the correspondence itself,
has been to rebuke the unwarrantable assumption by a certain class of clergymen of a kno\vledge of Constitutional law
superior to that possessed by lawyers, and which entitled

'
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them to pronounce ex cathedra upon Constitutional questions, to sneer at and abuse those whC, differed from them,
and to brand them as traitors, sympathizers with the rebellion, and other hard names of that character, merely for the
expression of their legal opinions.
You make no attempt to sustain the Constitutional law
of your Fraternity lecture, nor to justify your outrageous
assault upon the " People's party " in that, and in your editorials, except by referring to the election returns, and your
assumption that the P eople's movement gave aid and comfort to the rebels. In relation to the first, I have only to say,
that the result justified none of the abuse and misrepresentation by and through which that result was in a great measure obtained. If a witness, indicted for perjury, should
allege in defence, that the jury gave a verdict in favor of the
party for whom he and others like him swore upon the trial,
it would hardly be regarded as a sufficient answer to the
evidence of the false swearing.
In regard to the charge that the People's movement gave
aid and comfort to the rebels; assuming the fact to be so, it
was because you and your compeers, fearing that your favorite candidates would not be elected in a fair open canvass,
thought it expedient to bear testimony that the People'~
party were "guerillas_ of J efferson Davis," " traitors," &c;
Possibly the rebels did not know any better than to believe
your assertions upon that point. So far as the members of
the People's party were permitted to speak for themselves,
the speech expressed th~ most decided and persistent hostility to them.
·But you turn upon me, in a mere personal attack. You
quote from my letter thii, sentence: " This impudent assumption, by clergymen, of a knowledge of Constitutional law, superior to, and entitling them to overrule the opinions
of those who have been educated to the profession, is a nuisance,
which has existed quite too long upon sufferance ; but when it is
coupled with denunciations of all lawyers who express opinions different from those of such clerical experts, as 'traitors,' 'disloyal,'
'guerillas of Jeff. Davis,' 'giving aid and comfort to the enemy,' the
nuisance becomes intolerable, and I design to exert my humble efforts
to abate it."
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Professing to confine your reply to the point there made,
you say:" If I understand it, you assume for yourielf, and for the profession
to which you belong, a monopoly of all knowledge of 'Constitutional
law,' and you particularly avow that it is an intqlerable nuisance,
which you design to abate, that clergymen should presume to have,
or to utter any opinions of their own upon Constitutional questions
unless those opinions happen to square with those of ' the profession.'
You especially think that my ' cheeks ought to tingle' with shame,
be\!ause I have bad the 'effrontery' to differ from Mr. Justice
Curtis."

Now if you do understand it, here are, in this short paragraph, three assertions directly contrary to the truth. First, You know, or ought to know, that I do not assume, and
have never assumed, any such thing for myself, or the profession to which I belong, as a monopoly of all knowledge
of Constitutional law. What I have claimed for the profession and myself, is a right to form and express opinions upon
Constitutional law without being overruled ex catkedra by a
class of pretentious clergymen, having those opinions sneered
at as the results of old fogyism, and ourselves denounced as
traitors because of those opinions. T his is no assumption
w hatever. Secori:d, - You know, for you had the paragraph
before you and extracted it, that the ''intolerable" nuisance
w hich I designed to exert my humble efforts to abate was,
not that clergymen should presume to have or to utter
any opinions of their own upon Constitutional questions
unless those opinions happen to square with those of the
profession, - against which I never uttered a word,- but
the nuisance was precisely as described in the extract, an
" impudent assumption by clergymen of a knowledge of
law superior to, and entitling them to overrule the opinions
of, those who have been educated to the profession;" which
became intolerable when coupled with denunciations of
those tawyers, from whom these clerical experts differed,. as
"traitors," "disloyal," "guerillas of J eff. Davis," "giving aid
and comfort to the enemy." This neither expresses or
implies any denial of a right on the part of any clergyman,.
or any one else, to have and to utter any opinions which he
2
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pleases upon Constitutional law. Tllird, - You know, that
in my reply to your letter I expressed no opinion that your
cheeks ought to tingle with shame because you have had
t he effrontery to differ from l\'lr. J ustice Curtis. It was "the
exposure of your utter incapacity to deal with a grave Constitutional question," and "the effrontery of your assumption
of a right to sit in judgment upon the legal opinions of Judge
Curtis, and to talk of his mournful fallacies," that I thought
ought to make your cheeks tingle. Accusing Judge Curtis
of "writing a pamphlet to aid and comfort the rebels, by
pushing with all his might such heresies," and saying that
Prof. Parsons's communication in the Daily Advertiser
"explodes the mournful fallacies of the unfortunate J udge,"
is something more than differing from Mr. Justice Curtis.
You say in another part of your Jetter," I did speak of the'
mournful fallacies of Judge Curtis's pamphlet. I thought
it. As a citizen I had the right to say it- respectfully, as
I did." You most surely havc strange ideas of 1·espect.
There is no "respectfully" in any part of your notice of it,
either in words, or manner, - in form, or substance. Whether
you are singular in your opinion is not the question. I have
not undertaken to discuss that; but I may say that neither
the President, nor many members of the public bodies you
name, would exhibit their respect or courtesy by similar
remarks respecting Mr. Justice Curtis, and his opinions.
Again, you say, " Now the question is, whether I, as a
citizen - though a clergyman and an editor - have not as
much right as you or your colleague can have, to express an
opinion on this same matter, which is practical alike to all."
P ermit me to say that the question is no such thing. You
enter into an elaborate defence of your right to form your
own opinions, to express them, and to vote as you think fit.
You know, or ought to know, that I have never denied t hat
right. With respect to all that you say about a clergyman's
sharing the rights and duties common to other citizens - of
the right of any citizen to study for himself all interests
involved in the election, to form his own judgment, and to
vote as he pleases, I have no controversy whatever. I have
never denied any of these rights, and shall not begin to do so
now. I admit the right of all persons, - clergymen of course
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included, - to express their opinions upon proper occasions,
and in a suitable manner, with a view of inducing others to
adopt the same opinion. I call no man a traitor because he
votes differently from what I do. That is reserved for you
anp those like you, who assume the right to determine how
men shall vote, or be denounced for exercising the freedom
of their own wills. I do not accuse large bodies of men of
flank movements in aid of the rebellion, and af giving aid and
comfort to the rebels; even if they sustain by their votes the
cry for universal emancipation, by a proclamation, although
I have an undoubting opinion that there is no authority in
any branch, or all the branches of the United States Government, to do any such thing; ·and I believe, (though I do not
assume that familiarity with the rebel councils that you
claim to possess,) that nothing would gratify them more
than a paper attempt at emancipation - emancipation of
the slaves of the loyal, as well as the disloyal- because
nothing would serve better to unite them in a determination
to fight to the uttermost, on the plea that such an attempt
was, or would be, inconsistent with the Constitutional rights
of -the several States; -which they do not need anybody
at the North to tell them.
Again. I find in your letter the following sentence :
" Allow me to say, that for you now, simply as a lawyer, to
deelare tha:t the people of these United States cannot understand the Constitution which they have made without coming to you to find out what it means, and what they may do
under it, is an 'arrogance' and an 'impertinence' and an
'effrontery,' quite equal to anything of which you assume
any clergyman ever to have been guilty."
I cannot allow you to say any such thing, because it implies, as you well know, that I have, in some form, substantially made such a declaration; which you either know, or
o~ght to know, is an implication without the least foundation. This kind of argument,- assuming that pretensions
have . been set up, which were never even thought of, which is worthy only of a pettifogging lawyer in the lowest
purlieus of criminal jurisprudence, will not serve your
purpose.
Finally. In reply to my question whether, in speaking of
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tltis flank movement, you intended to imply that the rebellion was the movement in front, in aid of which this movement in Massachusetts was an attack upon the flank of the
Government, and thus to give significance to your talk about
"treason" and the " rope's end ? " You say, "I did mean
'to imply' just that."
You stand convicted, then, by your own declaration, of a
deliberate intention to charge those engaged in the" People's movement" with the crime of treason. You know that
a flank movement in aid of the· movements of the rebels in
front, is, of course, either by the enemy, or by an ally of the
enemy. It is a direct participation in the war. It is as
treasonable as the movement in front, having the same general object and purpose. And you meant deliberately to
charge this upon large numbers of the people of Massachusetts. If there is a depth of political prostitution lower than
this, you will probably sound it yet, but I am not just now
advised what it can be. It will not do to say that you
accuse no member of the People's party of the intent to
commit treason in action, for there can be no such flank
movement in aid, without an intent; and there is no treason
without an intent either express, or at least implied from the
circumstances.
If you are content to stand before the people in lhe position in which you have thus placed yourself, I am content
to leave you there.
W ith due respect, as before.
CAMBRIDGE,

Nov. 22, 1862.

UNCONSTITUTIONAL DI VINITY.

17

TO THE REV. LEONARD BACON, D. D.,
NEW llAVEN, CONN.

No. 1.

Sm, - I have undertaken the performanc.e of a duty which
some one owes to the profession of the L aw, and to the community generally; and the obligation rests upon me, perhaps,
equally with others. It is the duty of vindicating the right
of the gentlemen of the Bar to form their opinions upon legal
subjects, and especially upon the construction of the Constitution of the United States, and to express those opinions in
any manner consistent with due courtesy to others, without
being subjected to censure, sneers, abuse, a nd vituperation,•
by a class of clergymen who assume to know more of Constitutional law than the tribunals and officers created and
constituted for the purpose of discussing and determining
legal questions. So long as this assumption by clergymen
was confined to dogmatic opinions, sneers, and mere censure, it might be, and was in a great measure, overlooked;
but when, as bas lately been the case, clerical gentlemen
have proceeded to denounce lawyers who differ from their
notions of Constitutional law as "disloyal," "sympathizers
with the rebels," "traitors," &c., the matter assumes a more
grave aspect; and it becomes important t hat the pretensions
of this portion of the clergy to a better knowledge of the
rules by ·which the meaning of the Constitution is to be
ascertained should be fairly examined. This is not a mere
matter of professional esprit. If the clergy really have the
best set of rules by which to determine our Constitutional
rights and duties, then those rules should be recognized, so
that the construction of the different clauses of the Constitution, and of the powers of those who administer the government under it, may be as uniform as the nature of the
case will admit. If, on the other hand, the mode of reasoning which this class of clergymen apply to the subject is
altogether fallacious and inconclusive, leading to inconsistencies and contradictions, then it is quite time that it should
2•
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not be made the basis upon which the opinions of lawyers
are to be depreciated and substantially overruled, and those
who entertain the opinions denounced as the enemies of the
government and of liberty.
I am fully aware that among the lawyers themselves there
is a difference of opinion upon various questions of Constitutional law. But that is not at all material to the present
inquiry, which has no reference to the differences of construction by different lawyers, but is, whether clergymen are entitled to pass final judgment, and overrule any and all lawyers with whom they differ on such subjects.
Connected with the inquiry, in the present instance, is
another, to wit, -what are the reasons upon which this class
of clergymen found their support of the Proclamation of
Emancipation, as a measure authorized by the Constitu1tion?
In pursuit of the object above indicated, my studies, for a
fe,v days past, have been somewhat more than usual within
the columns of " The Congregationalist; v and I find in the
number issued October 31, certain " Views from a Watch
Tower," respecting " the Great Proclamation." The contents of the article seem to place it within the scope of my
inquiries ; and an editorial note in another column says,
"Many of our readers who for several weeks have been
looking for Dr. Bacon's views of the Proclamation, will find
them given at length in the ' Watch Tower' column." I
address this letter therefore to you.
You say, in the outset, that you "have not been in a hurry
to give out your thoughts on the President's great Proclamation," and that what you say in the article "is the result of
some deliberate thinking." The matter is of course entitled
to a more grave. consideration than it would have been had
you been "among those who spoke first," in which case, as
you well say, you " might have spoken inconsiderately."
flaving endeavored with some care to ascertain the
"Views" expressed after such deliberation, it appears that,
so far as they are material to the present purpose, they may
be summed up as follows: 1. That" The proclamation is made at a time when its necessity, as a war
measure for the preservation of the Union, can no longer be doubted
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by any man truly loyal to the Constitution. The long delay, whether
wise or unwise, has made the necessity too manifest to be disputed, except by those who have so kmg paid a debasing lwmage to slavery, for
tl1e sake of ' sav£ng the Union,' that tl1ey are now willing to sacrifice
the Union for the sake of saving slavery. All sitch persons, South or
North, are infqct disloyal to the Constitution."

2. That -

" The time has come when all men are compelled to see tliat either
the Union must be broken up; or, the rebel States must be brought
back by the concession of great Constitutional changes adverse to liberty, and to the principle of government by majorities ; or, the war
must be indefinitely prolonged ; or, that policy must be adopted which
recognizes the rebels, not as a political party, whose opposition to the
government is a little irregular, and must be gently corrected, but as
enemies to be destroyed. If such a policy is adopted, then the terri£,ory held by the rebels must be recognized as lwstile tei-ritory, to be
conquered and reannexed. If such a policy is adopted, the war against
the rebels must be war in earnest, and we must cease to be hampered
by any supposed necessity of helping the rebels against their own
domestic enemies, or by imputing any validity whatever to their laws
for the enslaving of the negroes."

3. That-

" The proclamation is made at a time when everybody knows that
if the Union is to be saved, and the Constitution is to stand as it is, and
if the war is not to be interminable, the preposterous policy which
regards the enslaved as property, and property in slaves as preeminently
sacred, must be abjured at once and forever."

4. That you-

" Cannot avoid the conviction that the men wlio oppose the p~oclamation, and talk about bringing the war to an end in some other way, expect nothing else - and intend nothing else - than some concession to
the rebels, which sliall either divide tlie Union, 01· subvert the Constitution."

5. You say,-

" The proclamation, then, marks a definite stage of progress in the
prosecution of the war. Henceforth, the war is not merely a military
demonstration, to put down a disturbance in certain districts, where the
machinery of a legitimate government under the Constitution is• supposed to be still in operation ; - it is now the earnest r eality of war to
crush a powerful and desperate enemy, - to regain by conquest a wide
territory, toliich has been wrested from the people of tlle United States,
to whomit rightfully bewngs, - to establish the Constitution and tl,e laws
of the Union in regions over wliicli, at present, they have no more sway
orforce than tltey have in Patagonia.:'

'
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6. You say -

" Concerning the Constitutional power of the President to issue such
a proclamation, I have no shadow of a doubt."

7. You add" I am aware that some lawyers have undertaken to argue from the

Constitution, against the right of the President to do what he has
done in this respect."
8. And to the above you add, further, ." But though a hundred lawyers should undertake to convince me
that the government is restrained by the Constitution from defending
its o,wn existence in a civil war, or that t'1e1·e is any one of the 1-ights
of a belligerent w/;ich it may not exercise in the territory of a State
which has rejected the Constitution, and made war upon the Union, they
· can never impose that absurdity upon me, nor upon any man who is
not willing to abnegate his own.common sense in favor of somebody
else's profossional sense."
•

9. T o this is subjoined, -

" l /ia,;e a great respect for lawyers in tlieii' place, but I must be permitted to remember that lawyership is not the same thing with statesmanship; and to insist that the Constitution of the United States, like
the Bible, is to be interpreted by the common sense of the people."

10. You

·

" Find that though Congress has the right to declare war, the President alone bas the right to make war."

And thereupon you say-

" 'l.'o my common sense, the right and the duty, to make war against
the enemies of the United States, be they foreigners or rebels, involves,
or ratl~er is the right and the duty cf conquering and crushing them
by every legitimate method of war."

You then inquire -

" Has the President a right by the Constitution, and is it his duty
to wage war in South Carolina,- has he a right and is it his duty to
bombard cities, to l,urn villages, to cut down groves and forests, to
obstruct harbors, to turn rivers from their channels, and to mow down
regiments of men in battle, when these measures are necessary to a
speedy and thorough conquest, - has he a right to do all this in defiance of the only government and laws now existing in that State, and has he not a right to proclaim that, after a certain day, unless the
people of that State shall in the mean time reestablish a State Government under the Federal Constitution, no distinction shall be recognized
among them but the distinction between friends and enemies of the
United States, and that every friend, whatever. his former condition,
shall be recognized and protecte~ as a freeman ? "
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Whereupon you exclaim -

" Shame on the law-logic which undertakes to mystify our common

11. You ask further -

" If the President, or a military commander, acting by his authority,

may seize private property, when needed for military purposes -if
he may take cotton, provisions, forage, horses, and all sorts of cattle,
from the loyal as well as the disloyal - giving to loyal owners an
assurance of indemnity hereafter; may he not also take this property
with a like assurance of indemnity to loyal owners?"

12. You take a distinction : -

" Instead of proclaiming the universal and perpetual abolition of
slavery in the United States, the President only otfers freedom to certain slaves. This is correct. Abolition is an act of political sovereignty.
Emancipation may be, and in this case is, a military necessity. Meanwliile, just as fast as our armies advance, and just-as fast as slaves of
rebel masters come within our lines, tlie process of actual emancipation is going on under tlze acts of Oongi·ess, and it could not be accelerated by any proclamation."

13. Another distinction: -

" The President has no right to emancipate any slave on the ground
that slavery is wrong, but he has a right, as Commander-in-Chief of
the Army and Navy, to proclaim the emancipation of slaves on the
ground that their emancipation is necessary as a means of crushing
the rebellion."

14. Is an admission : -

" L et it be remembered that the President of the United States is
not an autocrat like the Emperor of Russia; be is a public $ervant,
whose powers are strictly limited."

T he foregoing propositions are extracted from your article
in your own words. I have preferred to give them in this
mode, instead of abbreviating by an abstract, in order to
avoid all cavil; and I have endeavored to give faithfully all
your propositions which are material to the due understanding of your legal and Constitutional doctrines, omitting nothing which introduces any material qualification to what is
above stated. Part of the italics are mine, for the purpose
of calling attention to some of the more material portions.
The 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th serve to mark your estimate of
the opinions of lawyers in relation to the subject-matter, and
the manner in which you see fit to place the profession before
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the community. In the 8th, you misrepresent their opinions,
by implication, in assuming that arguing "from the Constitution against the right of the President to do what he has
done" is substantially an argument, "that the government
is restrained by the Constitution from defending its own existence. in a civil war," - a proposition, the truth of which, I
think, no lawyer ever undertook to convince you, or any one
else. It is certainly not embraced in an assertion that the
President has no right, under the Constitution, to emancipate
all the slaves in.the Seceding States, by a Proclamation. A
proclamation of general emancipation in the Seceding States
is one thing, the defence of the government is another, and a
very different, thing. And it is a false argument to reason
as if they were identical, assuming in that way", that people
have said what never entered into their thoughts.
The 9th proposition shows that you consider lawyers out
of place in the attempt to discuss and determine the Constitutional questions which affect the right to issue the proclamation. You "have a great respect for lawyers in their
place," but you evidently have no respect for them here,
where the matter is to be determined by somebody's "common sense," "(we will inquire whose, by and by,) and not by
"law logic," upon which you cry" shame," because. it "undertakes to mystify our common sense." And the 1st and
4th show, that not only lawyers, but all others who dissent
from your views by doubting the necessity of the proclamation, are, in your opinion, " disloyal to the Con,;titution; "
that they" have so long paid a debasing homage to slavery,"
"that they are now willing to sacrifice the Union for the sake
of saving slavery;" and t hat they "intend nothing else than
some concession to the rebels which shall either divide t he
Union or subvert the Constitution." You italicized the word
"intend " to .make it emphatic.
As you have thus chosen to place yourself before the public
in a position of antagonism to all lawyers, and all others
who do not concur with you in having no doubt respecting
the right of the President to issue the Proclamation, branding them so far as you may with "disloyalty,,' "debasing
homage to slavery," and with an intent " to divide the Union
or subvert the Constitut-ion ;" I certainly cannot be charged
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with a want of courtesy if I presume to examine, with entire
frankness, your claims thus to sit in judgment upon the members of the ·profession, and all others with whom you differ
respecting Constitutional law. Perhaps I use that term un~
advisedly, for if the recent pretensions of a portion of the
clergy are well founded, there would seem to be no longer
any Constitutional law, that having been merged and swallowed up in Constitutional divinity.
T he accusation, which you thus publish to the world, falls
very far short of a decent civility. If it shall be made manifest that the pretensions to a super~or legal wisdom are entirely unfounded, - the atrocity of your imputation of disloyalty, and of an intent to commit treason, will not be mitigated by the arrogance which, iQ that case, will appear to
have prompted it.
Yours, &c.
CAMBRIDGE,

Nov. 28, 1862.

T O THE REV. LEONARD BACON, D. D.
No. 2.

Sm,- In my letter of the 28th of November I extracted
from yom "Watch-tower column," in" The Congregationalist" of October 31, certain propositions which appeared to
present your "views" of the "great proclamation," and particularly your argument in favor of the Constitutional right
of the President to issue it, involving of course a construction
of the provisions of the Constitution by which it is supposed
that authority for that p1J.rpose is conferred; for you admitted,
in the extract which I numbered 14, that the President " is a
public servant whose powers are strictly limited."
As you cry "shame on the law logic which mystifies our
common sense;" assert that a hundred lawyers could not
convince you, &c., and very distinctly imply that lawyers are
out of place in attempting to ascertain the true construction
of the Constitution, upon this subject, at least ; I propose,

-
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before proceeding to examine your argument, to consider
the rules by which lawyers exercise this " law logic" in determining questions respecting the true interpretation and
meaning of different parts of the Constitution and other
documents; and to institute a comparison of those rules
with the rule which you appear to regard as a much more
safe and certain one than "law logic."
B lackstone says, " The fairest and most rational method to interpret the will of the
legislator, is by e:x:ploring bis intentions at the time when the law was
made, by signs the most natural and probable. And these signs are
either the words, the context, the subject-matter, the effects and consequence, or the spirit and reason of the law."
H e makes a short commentary upon each of these, as follows (omitting his illustrations) : ·
1. " Words are generally to be understood in their usual and most
known significations ; not so much regarding the .Propriety of grammar, as their general and popular use."
2. "If words happen to be still dubious, we may establish their
meaning from the context; with which it may be of singulat· use to
compare a word or a sentence, whenever they are ambiguous, equivocal or intricate."
3. "As to the subject-matt~, words are always to be understood as
having regard thereto ; for that is always supposed to be in the eye
of the legislator and all his e:x:pressions directed to that end."
4. "As to the effects and consequence, the rule is, that when the
words bear none, or a very absurd signification, if literally understood,
we must a little deviate from the received sense of them."
5. "But lastly, the most universal and effectual way of discovering
the true meaning of a law, when the words are dubious, is by considering the reason and spirit of it, or .the cause which moved the legislator to enact it."

Mr. Justice Story, in his " Commentaries upon the Constitution," has a chapter u pon the " R ules of Interpretation."
My limits will not admit of extensive quotations. A few
extracts will suffice. H e says, " The first and fundamental rule in the interpretation of all instr uments is, to construe them according to the sense of the terms, and
the intentil)n of the parties;" - " that in construing the Constitution
of the United States, we are in the first instance to consider, what are
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its nature and objects, its scope and design as apparent from the structure of .the instrume11t, viewed as a whole, and also viewed in its component parts. When its words are plain, clear and determinate, {hey
require no interpretation, and it should therefore be admitted, if at all,
with great caution, and only from necessity, either to escape some absurd consequence, or to guard against some fatal evil."

H e then proceeds to give rules applicable where the words
are not plain and clear ; and adds : " Where the words are unambiguous, but the provision may cover
more or less ground, according to the iotention, which is yet subject
to conjecture ; or where it may include in its general terms morn or
less, than might seem dictated by the general design, as that may be
gathered from other parts of tl1e instrument, there is much more room
for controversy; and the argument from inconvenience will probably
have different influences upon different minds. Whenever such questions arise, they will probably be settled - each upon its own peculiar
·grounrl.s ; and whenever it is a question of power, it shmtld be approached with infi1~ite caution, and affirmed, only upon the most persuasive reasons. In examining tl1e Constitution the antecedent situatio11 of tlze country, and its institutions, the existence and operations of
the State Govemments, the powers .and ope'rations of the Go11federation - in short, all the circumstances, wliich had a tendency to produce
or to obstruct its fonnation and ratification, deserve a careful attention.
Much, also, may be gathered from contemporary history, and eontem
porary interpre_tation, to aid us in just conclusions."
"A power given in general terms is not to be restricted to particular cases, mereIy because it may be susceptible of abuse - and, if
abu~ed, may lead to mischievous consequences."
"On the other hand a rule of equal importance is not to enlarge tlie
constt·uctiori of a given power beyond the.fair scope ofits terms, merely
because the restriction is incom:enient; impolitic or even mischievous.
If it be mischievous, the power of redressing the evil lies with the
people by an exercise of the power of amendment."

He closes his statement of some of the more important
rules to be employed in the interpretation of the Constitution, by adverting to a few belonging to mere verbal criticism,
the first of which is : " Every word employed in the Constitution is to be expounded in
its ph1in, obvious, and common sense, unless the context furnishes
some ground to control, qualify and enlarge it. Constitutions are not
designed for metaphysical or logical subtleties, for niceties of expres3
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sion, for critical propriety, for elaborate shades of meaning, or for the
exen+-e of philosophical acutene~::, or juridic..,! research. Tbey are
instrnments of a practie,,l nature, foull(]ed on th e common business of
human life, adapted to common want~, de::igned for common use, and
fitted for common understanding~. The people make them; the people adopt them; the people must be supposed to read them, with the
help of common .;;en~e ; and caunot be p,-es«med to admit in tliem any
recondite meaning, or any extraordinary gloss."

After divers observations upon the construction to be given

to words which have different shades of meaning, and tech-

nical words, he says : -

" Bnt the most important rule, in cases of this natm·e is, that a conHitution of government does not, and cannot, from its nature, depend
in :my great degree upon mere verbal critici~m. Such criticism mny
not be wholly without its u~e ; it may sometimes illu~trate or unfold
the appropriate sense; but unless it stanch well with the context and
subjcc-L-matter, it must yield to the latter." . . . "That must be
the tnrn5t exposition which harmonizes with its d~ign, its objects, and
its g eneral structure." - Sto,-y's Commentaries on tlle Constitutio11,
octavo edition, pp. 136,137, 142,144,157, 161, 162.

Such arc some of the most important rules long established and recognized by the most able jurists, by means of
which the "law logic" upon which you cry" shame," attempts
to solrn legal questions, and to arrive at just conclusions.
On t he other hand your rule of construction, by means of
which the powers given by the Constitution are to be ascertained, is, I admit, of a different character. It. is quite simple, if not q nite certain. You state it as if it were the common sense of the people, bat it appears to be your own
common sense. That is to answer in lieu of all other rules,
not merely to ascertain the meaning of words for which it
might be admissible, but to settle all other questions which
may arise respecting the Con::;titational power of the President, at least. You say in the 9th extract that you must
"be permitted to remember that lawyership is not the same
thing with state~manship; and to insist that the Constitution of the United States, like the Bible, is to be interpreted
by the common sense of the people." But just afterwards
you say, "I find,'' &c., and again, "I find," &c., and again,
"I find," &c., and then you ·add, " 2o my common sense, the
right and duty to make war against the enemies of tl1e
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United States, be they foreigners or rebels, involves or rather

is the right and duty of crushing them by every legitimate
method of war." It is quite evident that when you insist

that the Constitution is to be interpreted by the common
sense of the people, you mean that it is to be interpreted by
the common sense of Dr. Bacon ; and your reasoning is
based upon that as your rule of construction. It is quite
idle, if not something worse, to talk about a decision by the
common sense of the people at large; in favor of the author•
ity of the President to issue the proclamation. It is very
apparent that no uninfluenced popular vote could exhibit the
common sense of the people upon any question of Constitutional construction, and if the vote were to be influenced by
persistent assertions that all whose opinions were adv«:,rse to
the power of the President, had " so long paid a debasing
homage to slavery for the sake of saving the Union, that
they are now willing to sacrifice the Union for the sake of
saving slavery;" and that all such persons "are in fact dis•
loyal to the Constitution," the common sense of the people
might be quite as much mystified thereby as by any "law
logic" which could be presented to their consideration.
You have no expression of the common sense of the peo~
ple, meaning thereby the expression of the popular will, upon
the subject, and it is entirely deceptive to talk of a construction of the Constitution by such a rule. 'rhe popular meaning of words may ordinarily be found by a resort to the
dictionaries, but popular conclusions are not recorded there.
Individuals express their opinions, and a certain aggregation
of "Views" may thus be obtained. But there is no mode
of taking the opinions of the people at large on such subj ects. There has been no action of the people since the
proclamation was talked of, which can be supposed, even in
a remote degree, to give the results of their common sense
respecting the authority to issue it, unless it is to be found
in the recent elections, and thus far it is decidedly adverse to
your conclusions.
I proceed to an examination of the logic of your common
sense as exhibited in the "Views" which you have furnished
to the community.
One of your positions, in support of the right of the Pres-
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ident to issue the proclamation, is, in substance, that the
Government may exercise all the rights of a belligerent, in
the territory of l:L State which has rejected the Constitution
and made war upon the Union. Your phraseology is, that
"though a hundred lawyers should attempt to convince me"
- "that there is any one of the rights of a belligerent which
it [the Government] may not exercise in the territory of a
State," &c., "they can never impose that absurdity upon me,
nor upon any man who is not willing to abnegate his own
common sense in favor of somebody else's professional
sense."
As these "rights of a belligerent" are offered to show that
the proclamation might lawfully be issued, they are not of
courst} acquired by or through the proclamation, but exist
independent of it. If the G"vernment has such rights, they
date back to the commencement of the wa.r. There bas been,
so far as I am aware, no time since the period when t he
Government brought its armies into active warfare, that it
has assumed or acquired any rights as a belligerent which it
did not possess, say at the first battle of Bull Run.
I suppose it may be understood that by "the rights of a
belligerent," in this connection, you mean something more
than the right to suppress an insurrection by forcible means,
which means, from the magnitude of the rebellion, have assumed the proportions of war. In other words, you must
intend that the Government has all the rights of a belligerent
which would be recognized by the law of nations in a foreign
war. Unless the proposition means that, it means nothing
to the purpose of your argument. Whether, meaning that,
it is to the purpose, we will consider hereafter.
I have no doubt that the Government, by acknowledging
the Confederate States as a belligerent, as England and
France have done, may assume to it:;elf all belligerent rights.
But I think it may safely be asserted, that there is no war,
foreign or domestic, in which one of the parties is entitled
to all the rights of a belligerent, as recognized by the law of
nations, unless the other party is also entitled to the same
rights. Practically, there cannot be a war in which there is
only one belligerent; and it seems that there can be no war
in which one of the belligerents can be recognized as having
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all belligerent rights, and the other none of them. If we
claim all these rights, we must concede them to the Confederates.
There may be an insurrection, and the Government may
seek to assert its authority by force, in which neither party
is entitled to the rights of a belligerent: The two parties
might be, as they are in this case, belligerents so far as certain foreign nations are concerned, because of the recognition by such nations of the insurgents as a belligerent party.
But, as between themselves, however grave the proportions
of the contest, their status is as to each other, that of the
preceding lawful authority asserting itself, on the one hand,
and rebels attempting to produce revolution, on the other;
and all acts of active hostility on the part of the_rebels would
be treason, and punishable accordingly. But when the Government itself, instead of pursuing'its attempt to subdue the
rebellion, assumes to itself the character of a belligerent, the
rebels a re the other belligerent, and there can be no new
treason, subsequently, on the part of those who before were
traitors. The acts of Congress for the punishment of treason
by confiscation, &c., could no longer apply to subsequent
acts, as between beligerents there is no treason in acts of
hostility.
If the United States may exercise all the rights of a belligerent in the territory of a State which has rejected the
Constitution and made war upon the Union, -they may conquer the State, without doubt; and after the conquest treat
it as a territory, and change its laws. And so, on the other
hand, the State which has rejected the Constitution may, if
it can, not only conquer the United States, (which is undoubtedly true even if the case was one of mere insurrection), but in the attempt so to do such State would only be
exercising the lawful rights of the other belligerent; and if
the attempt should fail, those concerned in it would only be
subject to the common laws of warfare. The late incursion
into Maryland was, on your position, lawful war; and no
laws of the United States were broken by the forces concerned in it, so as to subject them to penalties. There are
authorities which tend to support these po~itions, unless they
are rejected as "law logic."
3*
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General Halleck, speaking of civil wars, says : " ,var1 of insurrection and of revolution are, in one sen~e, civil
wars; but this term is more usually applied to tbose conte~ts which
are wnged between rival families or faetions, for party ascendency in
a Stat<>, rather tban for its cli~memberment, or for a radical change in
its government. Each party, in such case, is usually emitled to the
rights of war as against the other, and, aloo, with respect to neutrals.
J1fere rebellions, howet·er, a1·e considered as exce,Jtions to tMs rule, as
et·ery Covernrne11t treats tltose wlio rebel against its autlwn'l!J according
to its ow11 municipal laws, and without regard to the general rules of
wat· which international jurisprudence estublishes between so\·creign
States." Ilallerk's l ntei-natio11al Law and Laws of War. Chap. 14,
sec. 9.

Unquestionably, if au insurrection involves large numbers
of people, and the hostilities thereupon assume the proportion a nd character' of a g,ave contest of arms, the contending parties must, in the exercise of an ordinary humanity, do
many things according to the recognized rules of war between independent nations, such as exchange of prisoners,
&c. This will not be inconsistent with the assertion of the
rightful supremacy of the existing Government over the
rebels, and the rig ht to treat their acts of hostility as treason.
But in proportion as the ordinary laws of war bet\veen· independent nations are applied to the existing hostilities, in that
proportion the impropriety of regarding the case as one of
mere rebellion, incurring the penalties of treason, will increase. If the Government, failing to suppress the rebellion,
assumes to itself all the rights of a belligerent, it d_?cs, upon
general principles, concede to the insurrectionary organization a quasi independent character. And Wheaton says : " A contest by force between independent sovereign State:, is called
a public war. If it is duly declared in form, or duly commenced, it
entitle» both the belligerent parties to all the rights of war against
each other." . . . . "Whaternr is permitted by the laws of war to
one of the belligerent parties is equally permitted to the other."
Wlieaton's Eleme11ts of l ntemational Law. Part I V., chap. 1,
sec. 6.

If the United States should authorize letters of marque
and reprisal against the insurgents, that would be a recognition of them as parties to a public war. If they should enter
into a truce or armistice, which only suspends hostilities,
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they would recognize them as a belligerent party capable of
agreeing upon such a temporary or quasi peace; and could
hardly after that claim a right to convict of treason for subsequent acts.
"lf, however," says Halleck, "the conditions of the truce be broken
by one belligerent, there is no doubt that the other may immediately
resume hostilities without any declaration." Halleck, Chnp. 27,
sec. 9.
·

This clearly recognizes the parties to a truce as upon equal
standing, thus far.
But your common sense, as you exhibit it in your "Views,"
tells you, and you tell the community, tha.t we may exercise
all the rights of a belligerent, at the same time that, "just as
fast as our armies advance, and just as fast ~s the slaves of
rebel masters come within our lines, the process of actual
emancipation is ·going on under the acts of Congress," (see
12th extract,) as if they were still in force against rebels.
Would it not be well if your common sense were a little
more consistent with general principles, and with itself?
In my next, I will consider your position respecting the
right of the· President to "make war," and respecting the
"conquest" of the seceding States.
Yours, &c.
CAMBRJDGK,

Dec. 5, 1862.

TO THE REV LEON ARD BACON, D. D.
No. 8.

Srn, - In my last letter I considered your proposition that
the United States have, as against the rebels, all the rights of
a belligerent, showing that such an assumption would concede to the rebels similar rights, as the other belligerent. If
such rights exist, they date from the commencement of active
hostilities, as there has been nothing since to change the
character of the war in this respect. T he proposition is,
therefore, inconsistent with a right, in the United States, to
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punish all acts of warfare by the rebels, as acts of treason inconsistent, of course, with the confiscation a'ct, which you
regard as in full force; and inconsistent, moreover, with the
introductory part of the proclamation itself, which declares
"that hereafter, as heretofore, the war will be prosecuted for
the object of practically restoring the Constitutional relation
between t he United States and the people thereof, in which
States that violation is or may be disturbed or suspended."
I proceed to examine next your statement, that you "fiud
that though Congress has.the right to declare war, the President
alone has the right to malce war." See Letter L, 10th extract,
This is, among ot.her things, to showathe right of the Presi• dent to issue the proclamation. How it could avail to sustain the right claimed, if the fact were so, is certainly not
apparent. Of that hereafter. The discovery is certainly of
no small import. So far as I am aware, you are entitled to
be chronicled not only as the first, but as the only person who
has made this particular discovery, unless perhaps some patent lawyer may contest your right.
To a certain extent, doubtless, it is in accordance with the
recent Republicam, dogma, that the President has a dght to
do whatever is required by the military necessity, and that
he is the sole judge of what is required by the military necessity, thereby making the President, in time of war, a military
despot. The differences however are so far material, that
perhaps neither infringes on the other:
I fear that the discovery or invention, whichever it may be
called, that the President alone has the right to make war,
and whoever may be the first finder, will not prove a useful
one. I deny entirely that you have found any such thing in
the Constitution. If the fact were so, then all the interference
of Congress in the making of war would be a usurpation of
the Constitutional right of the President and would of course
be unconstitutional. I have no doubt that very much of the
interference of Congress in the making of the present war
has been essentially mischievous, and has retarded, rather
than promoted, its success ; but the Constitutional right of
Congress to do many things in the making of war has not
heretofore, I think, been doubted.
I have searched in vain for a clause in the Constitution
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which can be construed, either by "law logic" or by any
common sense that I am acquainted with, as conferring upon
the President the sole power of making war. You refer in
this connection to but two provisions of the Constitution. I
will quote t he p aragraph, w hich was marked for insertion
among the extracts in my first letter, but omitted in an attempt at compression. It is this : " I find that the inaugural oath of the President, as prescribed in
that document, binds him to the duty, not merely of supporting, like
all other officers of the Government, but of preserving, protecting and
DEFENDING the Constitution, to the best of his ability. I find that
the Constitution, in order that he may perform his oath, makes him
"Commander-in-chief of the Army and Na,y.;, - [ And then you
add] - •• I find that though Congress.has the right to declare war, the
President alone has the right to make war."

In the absence of anything else, adduced for the purpose,
it seems that the first two findings are the basis of t he t hird.
But the oath to preserve, protect and defend the Constitution, certainly does not give to the President the power, nor
show that he alone has the power, to make war. The terms
do not embrace or imply it. The President might defend
the Constitution to the best of his ability, without a ny power
to make war. He is to defend it within the scope and power
of his office, and \Ve look elsewhere· to find the scope of his
powers. This is the first time, so far as I now recollect, in
which an official oath to discharge the duties of an office,
(and the whole oath of the President is of that character,)
has been supposed to contain a distinct and independent
grant of power, not otherwise conferred. I am quite sure
that it is the first instance in which the oath to support and
defend the Constitution has been supposed to contain within
it a grant of power to subvert the rights of t he States, and
thereby, practically to limit t hose amendments of the Constitution which declare, - that " the enumeration in the
Constitution of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny
or disparage others retained by the people;" and that "the
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
S tates respectively, or to t he people." The power of emancipation supposed to be cqnferred by this power to malce war,
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derived from the oath, is a power to change Constitutional
rights, so that rights which confessedly remain to the States
and to the peopl.e absolutely, in time of peace, shall be held
by them at the pleasure of the President in time of war; because, forsooth, he is bound by oath to preserve, protect and
defend the Constitution; of which these amendments are a
part.
Undoubtedly an oath of office may be expressed in such
terms, that the terms may serve to give a construction to
other provisions of a constitution, or law, whichever may
contain it. But that is not the case here. There is no other
provision which the language of the oath either restricts or
enlarges. It would be equaliy the duty of the President to
preserve, protect and defend t he Constitution if that clause
of the oath had been omitted. Its only design and operation
was, and is, to superadd the solemn sanction of an oath, to
secure more effectually, if necessary, the performance of the
duty which is imposed by the provisions vesting the executive power in the President, and constituting him Commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy.
But the provision constituting him Commander-in-chief
contains no exclusive grant of power to make war. It is the
duty of a Commander-in-chief to make war in conjunction
with such other authorities as may participate in making
war. It shows that the P resident has certain powers in relation to war, such as are usually possessed by a commander,
and may rightfully belong to a Commander-in-chief in a
Republican government, in which all grants of power are by
and through the Constitution, which limits and controls
power, as well as grants it. The duty of the President as .
the officer in whom the Executive power is vested, and ,vho
is at the same time Commander-in-chief, binds him to use
the proper powers of an Executive Magistrate, and a Commander-in-chief, in preserving, protecting and defending the
Constitution. The oath adds a solemn sanction to tbe duty.
But it is no part of the duty of a Commander-in-chief of the
United States to subvert State rights, or in time of war to
change provisions of t he Constitution, or to alter the State
laws. He may suspend the operation of the latter to a certain extent, wherever he carries martial law. But he cannot
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institute martial law beyond the limits where he can euforce
it at the time, aud where it may exist consistently with other
provisions of the Constitution.
Furthermore: in relation to your position that the President alone has the power to make war : The Constitution
provides that Congress shall have power to provide for the
common defence and general welfare of the United States.
That includes the power to provide for the defence of the
Constitution, and if it is necessary to defend i t by war, then
to make provisions for the defence in that mode. It is quite
as much the duty of Congress to defend the Constitution, in
the legislative department, as it is of the President to defend it in the executive department, and in his capacity as
Commander-in-chief. Congress has also, by express grant,
not only power to declcwe war, but power to grant letters of
marque and reprisals; to make rules concerning captures on
land and water ; to raise and support armies ; to provide and
maintain a navy; to make rules for the government of the
land and naval forces; and to provide for calling forth the
militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions. It is surely not necessary for me
to show that the exercise of these powers has quite as much
to do with the rnaking of war, as the marshalling of squadrons, or any other of what may be termed the ·executive
operations in the field.
The Constitution vests in Congress all legislative powers
therein granted. All the legislative powers exercised in making war (and without their exercise any war made by the
President alone v.rould be exceedingly short,) are powers of
making war vested in Congress.
Your finding " th at the President alone has power to make
war" ignores all the powers of Congress, above specjfied,
which relate to the making of war. Really, if you deal thus
with the Constitution, you should furnish the community
with an expurg;'lted edition, with notes and comments according to the rules of that particular kind of common sense
which excludes "law logic."
Another of your propositions is, that the policy you speak
of being adopted, "the territory held by the rebels, must be
recognized as hostile territory, to be conquered and re-
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annexed." !' Henceforth the war is," (as you say) "to regain: l;>y conquest a wide territory which has been wrested
from the people of the United States, to whom it rightfully
belongs - to establish the Constitution and the laws of the
Union in regions over which at present they have no more
sway or force than they have in Patagonia."
In stating this proposition 1 have omitted some intervening words, which serve rather to obscure, than to make clear,
the proposition itself. You have a way of intermixing matters which do not exist, or have no necessary connection with
each other, as if they formed parts of a single connected proposition, thereby presenting the subject-matter with a false
appearance. For instance, you say that policy must be
adopted which recognizes the rebels, not as a political party,
whose opposition to the Government is a little irregular, and
must be gently corrected, but as enemies to be de;troyed.
And then comes the recognition of the hostile territory to be
conquered and reannexed. See Extract No. 2. I suppose
that this prefatory matter is a little piece of clerical irony, as
I am not aware of any party which thinks that the irregularity is small, or that the correction should be gentle. Again,
(see Extract No. 3) you speak of "the preposterous policy
which regards the enslaved as property, and property in
slaves as preemi1)ently sacred." I know no party which
holds property in slaves as preeminently sacred, nor any such ,
policy; and this preemiuent sacredness which you introduce
· certainly has no necessary connection with the recognition of
slaves as property. Another instance, to which I have already
referred, and which I present again in this connection, for the
purpose of noting your mode of argument, is thus stated: " I am aware that some lawyers have undertaken to argue
from the Constitution against the right of the President to.do
what he has done. But though a hundred lawyers should
attempt to convince me that the Government is restrained by
the Constitution from defending its own·existence in a civil
war," &c., (see the 7th and 8th extracts) as if an argument
against the right of the President was an argument of that
character. It is not said that it is the.lawyers who are in
favor of gentle correction, and who hold slave property to be
preeminently sacred, but it may be left as inference, perhaps,
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that " all men who oppose tlie proclamation," maintain all
of these inferential, interpolated, opinions. I pray you to
consider whether this mode of reasoning is quite consistent
with that kind "of common sense" wh.ich should characterize a preacher of the gospel, however it may be used by
the profane sophists, who defend criminals in a police court,
or arg ue patent cases before juries.
Having said this much, by way of showing that in stating
your proposition respecting conquest, &c., I have left out
some of the intervening matter, not only because it is not
m aterial to the proposition itself, but because it serves to put
a false gloss upon it, I must reserve the inquiry upon what
ground it is that we are to recognize the seceded States, as
hostile territory, &c., for another letter.
Yours, &c.
CA~rnRIDGE, Dec. 9, 1862.

TO THE REV. LEONARD BACON, D. D.
No. 4.

Sm, - I proceed to the consideration of your propositi_on,
"that the territory held by t he rebels must be recognized as
hostile 'territory to be conquered and reannexed ; " - or, as
you state it in another paragraph, that "it is now the earnest
reality of war to crush a powerful and desperate enemy- to
regain by conquest a wide territory which has been wrested
from the people of the United States, to whom it rightfully
belongs - to establish the Constitution and the laws of the
Union in regions over which, at present, they have no more
sway or force than they have in P atagonia."
The territory occupied by the rebels comprises several
States which were in league with each other, and with other
States, under the Confederation, and the people of which
participated in the formation of the Constitution -and some
States which have been admitted into the Union since the
Constitution was adopted.
4
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i:rior to the rebellion, the Constitution extended over all
those States, binding them and others together in one government, for the purposes specified in that instrument.
When and how has the territory comprised within them
been "wrested from the people of the United States," so that
it " must be recognized as hostile territory to be conquered
and reannexed ? "
It must be remembered t hat the territory, so far as it is
comprised within the States existing at the t ime the Constitution was adopted, never belonged to the United States,
nor have the United States ever had any right in or over it,
except by the adoption of the Constitution, and through laws
passed in consequence thereof. Until the adoption of the
Constitution, the United States did not exist, but there was
State sovereig nty, limited to some extent by the articles of
Confederation. 'l'he adoption of the Constitution did not
confer upon the United States any territorial sovereignty,
except for the purposes and in the manner set forth and provided for in that instrument, t he State governments remaining as before. Of course there has not been - there cannot
have been - any wresting of the territory from the people of
the United States, except that t he rightful power which the
United States might and ought to exercise, under the Constitution, bas been subverted, or, rather, suspended, for the
time being, by force. And in that view, any reannexation
- which, by the way, is a very inappropriate term - would
be a restoration, so fa r as possible, of the state of things existing previous to the rebellion. But that would not be a
" conquest" ; and the use of t he terms ''conquest" and "rcannexed" serve to show that you mean something more than
the mere restoration of t he aurbority of the United States.
It is apparent, from the whole tenor of your article, that
you desire, through conquest a nd reamiexation, to accomplish
something which could not be done by the mere suppression
of the rebellion ; - that is to say, the emancipation of the
slaves.
Now I deny t hat any part of this territory has been wrested
from the people of the Uuited States. Waiving the fact that
the United States never held foll rights of sovereignty over
very large portions of it, I maintain that there never has
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been a time since the rebellion commenced when the territory has not belonged to the United States in as full "and
ample a manner as it did before that period ; that there has
not been any time when the jurisdiction of the United States,
political and legal, has not been as ample as it was before
the first act of secession was passed ; nor any time when
the laws of the United States have not been in force throughout the territory, precisely as they were prior to the insurrection; although, by reason of a treasonable and forcible opposition to their executio·n, the actual enforcement of them has
been obstructed and prevented.
If this is so, then it is preposterous, as well as mischievous,
to talk of conquest and reannexatwn.
The question recurs: When and how' has this territory
been "wrested from the people of the United States,'' so
that it " must be recognized as hostile territory to be conquered and reannexed "?
The fact that conventions of the people, in the several
States, have adopted acts of secession, does not wrest the
territory within those States from the United States. The
acts of secession are void; and the sovereignty, jurisdiction,
and authority of the United States remain as before.
The fact ' that the traitors are so numerous that they are
able to usurp the State authority and act as if they held the ·
legitimate State government, has not changed the character
of the rebellion from the crime of persons to the crime of
States. Since the adoption of the Constitution, the only
legitimate Constitutional government within a State is one
organized in accordance with the Constitution, recognizing
the existence of the government of the Union within its
proper sphere, although questions may arise respecting the
extent and exercise of its powers. The usurpation is rebellion, and did not change the legal relations of the United
States to the several States, nor the relations of the States,
as such, to the United States. So it was understood in
Congress when the following resolution was passed, which
has not been repealed, viz. :
"That the present deplorable civil war has been forced upon the
country by the disunionists of the Southern States, now in arms
against the Constitutional Government, aD<l in arms around the Cap-
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itol; that in this National emergency, Congress, banishing all feeling
of mere passion and resentment, will recollect only its duty to the
whole country; that this war is not waged on their part in any spirit
of oppression, 01· for any vurpose of conquest or subjugation, or purpo~e of O\'ertbrowing or interfering with the rights or established institutions of those States, but to defend and maintain the supremacy
of the Constitution, and to preserve the Union, with all the dignity,
equality, and rights of the several States unimpaired; and that as
soon as these objects are accomplished the war ought to cease."

The acts of the persons who have · participated in the insurrection were treasonable, but treason, by persons, is not
treason by a State, which cannot commit treason. T reason
by persons does not enlarge the sovereignty or authority of
the United States, nor cause a forfeiture of the rights of a
State, Mr. Sumner's litter of nine still-born resolutions to the
contrary notwithstanding. In accordance with this position
is the fact, that there are several members of Congress fro m
Virginia and Tennessee still holding their seats, notwithstanding the votes of secession and acts of u surpation and
war, in those States. Others, elected in Eastern Virginia,
have been denied seats, not because of secession and war,
but by reason of defects in the elections. The idea that a
State is felo de se, and bas become a territory of the United
States at the same time that it lives, as a State, by its representation in Congress, is of itself suicidal, if there were no
other objections, of which, however, there are ma ny. The
idea of establishing the Constitution in a State where it bas
been fully established, and continues established, so t hat ,
there is a representation in Congress under it, is a very perfect absurdity. A declaration, that in order to crush the rebellion, the territory of a S tate occupied by the rebE>ls, but
which has a reprc~entation in Congress, must be regarded as
hostile territory, to be conquered and reannexed, would be
an exhibition of superlative nonsense and folly, if these characteristics were not m erged in the iniquity of such a declaration, in unsettling men's minds respecting their rights and
duties. But the representation in Congress is only evidence
of the existing relations of a State. Georgia is a State in
the Union equally with Virginia, Tennessee, or Massachusetts. She might forthwith send a representation to Congress, without asking leave.
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That the war has not wrested the territory from the United
States, is apparent from what has been already stated. It
has not changed the legal relations. The existence of the
war neither requires conquest of territory or reannexation,
although it requires vigorous efforts to subdue the rebels. ·
The rebels occupied a part of Maryland in full force, and
with all the operations of war. It was wrested from us in
one sense, that is to say, forcible possession was taken.
But forcible possession, merely, is not what you mean.
The rebels have been· driven out of Maryland, but the territory has not been conquered or reannexed. The territory
they now occupy will not be "wrested" frorn us until they
achieve their independence. Then if we would regain it we
must conquer it.
Until that time they remain bound by their allegiance and
liable to punishment for the acts of treason which they commit within the territory they occupy; and the laws of the
United States are in force there for the punishment of that
treason. So Congress understood when that body, on the
27th of July, 1862, passed an act providing for seizure and
confiscation of property, and for emancipation in certain
cases. And so you seem to u nderstand, when you say, that .
"the process of actual emancipation is going on under the
acts· of Congress," &c. The provisions respecting treason
extend over the whole territory, and any other acts of Congress, applicable to that territory, are, of course, equally in
force there.
The question recurs. When and how has this territory
been wrested from the people of the United States, so that
i t must be recognized as hostile territory to be conquered
and reannexed. I await your answer.
Without doubt there was, and is, a practical suspension of
the relations between the United States and States where
the usurpation exists. The de facto government, which exists there, refuses to perform the Constitutional duties of the
legitimate Government, and along with many of the people,
obstructs the execution of t he laws of the Union. But all
this will terminate upon the suppression of the rebellion, and
the restoration of a legitimate administration of the State
4*
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government- a government de ju-re - without conquest or
reannexation.
If the insurrection shall be suppressed, there will be no
necessity to admit those States again, nor to reenact the
laws of the Un ited States which were in force there before
the insurrection commenced, nor even those of a general
character which have passed since that time, because there
will have been no time when the States were without the
pale of the Constitutior,, or when that, and all the laws of
Congress, were not legally in force there. When the force
of the rebels is overcome, the Courts of the United States
may resume the discharge of their appropriate functions
there, without any new laws for that puxpose.
T he Constitution still recognizes the rights of the inhabitants of those States, so far as they have not committed
crimes against the United States which cause a forfeiture,
just as it did before. 'fhe rights of property, real and personal, remain to be regulated by the State laws, and are
recognized by the United States as before. Among other
rights of property, the right of all persons who held slaves
under the State laws, to continue to hold them under those
laws, except as there may be an actual subversion under t he
operations of the war, and for offences committed, exists as
before, and will continue to exist after the fust of January.
And the right of the States to a representation founded upon
that basis will exist as before. This right of representation is
conferred by the Constitution. And the ordinances of secession, the insurrection, the usurpation of State authority, and
the' war itself, all combined, have not changed the Constitution.
It is hardly necessary to add, that the "great proclamation " has not wrested the territory from the people of the
United States, nor changed the Constitution, although it has
doubtless made i t much more difficult to reestablish the Constitutional authority of the United States in its active exercise over that territory.
Do you not k now, that in thus asserting that the territory
has been wrested from the people of tbe United States, and
must be regained by conquest, and that tbe war must be
waged for emancipation, you not only virtually admit t hat
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the ordinances of secession had validity, but that you make
war upon the Resolve of Congress, which I have cited above,
and commit a kind of petit treason against the "great proclamation"? The Resolve of Congress iJ(pressly asserts that
"the war is not waged on -their part for any purpose of
conquest or subjugation, or purpose .of overthrowing or interfering with the rights or established institutions of those
[Southern] States, but to defend and maintain the supremacy of the Constitution," &c. And the "great proclamation"
proclaims and declares "that hereafter, as heretofore, th!') war
will be prosecuted for the objects of practically restoring tlie
Constitutional relation between the United States and the
people thereof, in which States that relation is or may be
suspended or disturbed.
In another letter I will consi~er your argument, as drawn
from the fact that -certain things may be done in the enemy's
country in time of war.
Yours, &c.
CAMBRIDGE,

Dec. 16, 1862.

Note. - I have just seen in that pious political sheet, the
New York Independent, of Dec. 11th, this paragraph:" The army before Fredericksburg is still motionless. The prospect
of winter quarters grows more and more certain. The rebels paint
the word on boards and display it across the river to our troops with
jeering triumph. This shows how fatal they know an advance would
be to them."

Well, the advance has been made; and many a desolate
home and mourning household at the North testify how
"fatal" it has been to us. This is one of the results of
"the policy." Banks, instead of making a demonstr~tion
which might have drawn off Lee to the defence of Richmond,
has been sent- somewhere,· it is said, among other things,
" to make Texas a free State"; and Burnside is directed to
make a direct attack iQ frorit upon the enemy's entrenchments, under circumstances that render defeat almost, if not
quite, certain. Was this done to give us another exhibition
of Secretary Stanton's " military strategy"; or was it to satisfy the New York Tribune, which "sees in it much cause
.for public satisfaction"; or is this the mode in which your
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Constitutional emancipation is to be worked out? If this
is the way in which the "conquest" is to be made, what will
become of the great proclamation and the universal emancipation, and of your. Constitutional law, as connected therewith?

TO THE REV. LEONARD BACON, D. D.
No. 5.

Srn, - I proceed to the consideration of two of your propositions which have the sem blance of argument, but which
utterly fail to sustain your conclusion: They take the shape
of inquiries, to wit: " Has the President a right by the Constitution, and is it hia duty,
to wage war in South Carolina - has he a right, and is it his duty, to
bombard cities, to burn villages, to cut down groves and forests, to
obstruct harbors, to turn rivers from their channels, and to mow down
regiments of men in battle, when these measures are necessary to a
speedy and thorough conquest- has he a right to do all this in defiance of the only government and laws now existing in that State and has he not a right to proclaim that, after a certain day, unless the
people of that State Fhnll in the meantime reestablish a State government under the Federal Constitution, no distinction shall be recognized among them but the distinction between friends and enemies of
the United States, and that every friend, whatever his former condition, shall be recognized and protected as a freeman?"
"If the President, or a military commander, acting by bis authority, may seize private property, when needed for military purposes if he may take cotton, provisions, forage, horses, nnd all sorts of cattle
from the loyal as well as the disloyal - giving to loyal owner.s an
assurance of indemnity hereafter; may he not also take this property
with a like assu rance of indemnity to loyal owners?" See Extracts
10 and 11 in Letter No. 1.

For the purpose of showing wherein, and how, the argument in t hese inquiries falls entirely short of the purpose for
which you present them, it may be well, in the first place, to
ascertain distinctly what is, or is to be, the scope, force, and
effect of the " great proclamation."
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Much of the difference of opinion, which exists in the
community, respecting the power of the President to issue
the proclamation, is, I think, occasioned by a difference of
supposition respecting what it proposes, and is intended to
accomplish.
Some persons seem to think that the Constitutional power
is .not to be disputed, because the President may threaten
the rebels. It will do no harm. Perhaps they will be
alarmed, submit, and choose representatives in Congress
before the first of J anuary.
My dog, if I had one, might bark at the moon. . H e would
have a constitutional power so to do. But what mischief
would be done to the moon ; and what benefit would accrue
to the dog! The proclamation is, of itself, no more effective
for good than the dog's bark would be. It is doubtless a
much more efficient agent for evil.
The President may notify Queen Victoria, that if she
does not return Mason and Slidell within ninety days, he
will proclaim in what part of her Indian dominions the
sepoys shall be emancipated from the oppression to which
they are now subjected. I doubt whether he would be
liable to impeachment if he should do such a foolish thing.
But would Her Majesty be very much alarmed, by the notification, except as it indicated hostility ? And if he should
designate the limits, at the end of the ninety days, would
the sepoys be relieved from the oppression ? The measure
might serve to unite nearly all the people of England in a
bitter hostility to us. And that is the legitimate effect of
the proclamation, upon the people of the South. The rebels
know that the proclamation is of no avail without a successful war on our part. It is the war that they fear, and
not the proclamation. The newspaper paragraphs, stating
that the proclamation causes great alarm among them, are
baits to catch gulls, or, without a metaphor, lies to deceive
fools.
Some persons seem to regard the proclamation as a measure of punishment;- as a confiscation of slaves for the
crime of rebellion or treason. They say, may not the re~els
be punished by taking away their slaves, as well as other
property? Is property in slaves preeminently sacred?

..
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Admit that it is not; that confiscation is a proper punishment for treason; and that yonfi.soation may free slaves, as
well as convert other property of the traitor to the use of the
Government. But the President has no power to confiscate
the property of any person for treason. That is the province
of Congress, and t he J udiciary; and Congress, on the 17th
of J uly last, passed an act to punish treason, seize and confiscate the property of rebels, &c., which not only provides
for the emancipation of his slaves, upon the conviction of
the traitor, but enacts further, that all slaves of persons
engaged in the rebellion, or who give aid and comfort
thereto, escaping from such persons and taking refuge within
the lines of the army, and all slaves captured from such persons, or deserted by t hem and coming under the control of
the Government; and all slaves of such persons found or
\ being within any place occupied by rebel forces and afterwards occupied by the forces of the United States, shall be
deemed captives of war, and forever free from their servitude. If there may be some doubts respecting the Constitutionality of all portions of this enactment, it is much more
free from Constitutional difficulties than a proclamation, as a
measure of confiscation. Moreover, the emancipation of the
proclamation is, as your inquiries imply, to be of the slaves
of the loyal, as well as the disloyal. It is not to be sustained, therefore, as an act of confiscation.
Others are of opinion that the President, as Commanderin-chief, may direct that wherever the army goes, and overcomes the power of the rebels, the slaves shall be free; and
they construe the proclamation as meaning no more than
that; because, so far as the power of the master is not over•
come, it is clear that there can be no emancipation.
I have no doubt that where the army carries successful
warfare, there martial law-the law of force- is, for the
time being, the governing power for all the purposes of the
war; and as the liberation of the slaves - so far as that liberation is then and there a practical subversion of the power
of the master- may weaken the power of the rebellion, it
may be regarded as one of the means of carrying on the war.
T he slave may be required to perform labor and service, in
any of the warlike operations for the suppression of the rebel-
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lion. The power and control of the master over the slave
may thus be broken, for the time being, and the relation of
master and slave is thereby suspended. This is by the
legitimate effect of martial law - the law of force -which
supersedes the municipal law of the State. Now if the
slave avails himself of this subversion of the power and
control of the master - of this severance for the time being
of the relation of master and slave - and departs without
the limits where slavery is admitted, be -will secure the permanence of his freedom, because, as I maintain, he cannot
afterwards be claimed al)d returned under the fogitive slave
clause of the Constitution and the laws of Congress. He
acquired liberty, practically, without becoming a fugitive.
He is not a fugitive if he avails himself of that liberty to go
where he pleases, and so be cannot be sent back as a fugitive on the suppression of the rebellion. So also if the Government, during the time when the law of force is t he governing power, removes him from the 1imits where the municipal law requires his servitude.
Upon the same principle, I do not doubt that the President, as Commander-in-chief, or a commanding general in
the field, may, in the lawful exercise of hostilities, for the
purpose of weakening the enemy, invite the slaves to come
within the lines of the army, and assure them of protection,
which may be made eOectual by their removal beyond the
subsequent operation of the municipal law.
A commander may invite all persons within the hostile
lines to come within his camp, and to bring with them whatever gives strength to the enemy. And in regard to all
slaves who should comply with such a call, the relation of
master and slave would be actually severed, when they come
within the limits where the law of force, adverse to the servitude under such circumstances, is the governing power.
Corning within t.he lines un<ler such a lawful exercise of
military power, they could not be deemed fugitives, within
the meaning of the Constitution ; but would stand in the
same category with slaves, brought within its limits by the
march of the army. There might be a question, in both
cases, whether loyal masters were not entitled to indemnity.
T hat need not be settled at this time. ·
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But all this has no tendency to sustain the proclamation.
Military occupation - martial law- the law of the force
exerted by the army- only suspends the municipal law for
the time being. It docs not subvert i t permanently._ Neither
the commander of t he army in the field, nor the President,
can give to martial law any such extension, that it will subvert the municipal law, except so far as there has been, not
merely a suspension, but an actual change in the existing
state of things, by the operations of the war. It is not in
the nature of martial law to provide rules, prospectively, for
governing the rights and duties of persons after itself shall
have ceased to exist. What it has changed, is, of course,
subject to the change, as far as it goes. What it has not
changed, it cannot regulate for the future after it ceases.
The law of force operates so long as the actual military
force sustains it, but no longer. This is readily illustrated.
The army, in the course of its march, occupies the land of
an individual, and the officers take possession of bis house,
and are not trespassers. They take his crops and consume
them, and are not trespassers. No action will lie against
them at the time, or afterwards. He may, or may not, have
a claim upon the G-ovcrnmcnt for indemnity. When they
remove, he cannot, of course, regain his crops which have
been consumed, but the commanding officer has acquired no
title to his house or farm, nor any right to regulate his occupancy or power over that property, which thus remains,
after the war is over. His right to occupy and use was suspended by the war, and by the law of the force which drove
him out; but it was only suspended, and he enters and
holds under his old title. So it is with the crops not con•
sumed, and with his furniture. So it may be with his
slaves, who have been liberated from hits control for the time
being, and have been under the control of the military
power ; if t hey remain and give the master an opportunity
to assert his old title.
This is all the emancipation which can be had in the
comse of the war; and if I could read the proclamation as
extending no farther than such emancipation, I should have
no controversy with any one who supported it. The opportunity to secure freedom in this way was, I think, substan-
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tially provided for before the proclamation, by orders directing military commanders not to return slaves who came
within their lines. No proclamation was necessary for that
purpose; but an additional order for their removal, so that
they would be beyond the future control of their masters,
mig ht have been but an act of justice to them, especially if
they had been actively engaged in aiding the prosecution of
the hostilities on our part. A successful warfare would,
upon these principles, make the emancipation one of large
measure, sufficient to satisfy reasonable men. T aken in
connection with the restriction of slavery in t he territories, it
would probably give a death-blow to slavery.
But those w ho have so vigorously urged" the adoption of
a policy" and the issue of a "proclamation of emancipation,"
do not consider this the limit of the emancipation which is
to be effected by it. I understand that you give it a much
broader scope, as I believe you are authorized to do. You
say that it threatens the people in each rebel State "with
the emancipation of all their slaves" a nd speak of "the day
when every slave under the rebel power shall be (so far as
our Government is concerned) irrevocably free;" and it is,
doubtless, for this reason that you call it " the great proclamation." It is, of course, to g ive freedom after tlte retum of
peace, (if it does not prevent our arms from being victorious,)
to slaves wlw have never been witltin our power during tlte
war, - to slaves in the interior, who may never have heard
of the proclamation, - to slaves where mal"tial law never had
an existence,-to slaves w ho, during all the war, and up to the
return of peace, were as perfectly a nd as peaceably under the
full control of thJir masters as t,iey were before the war
commenced ; and who, during the war, had been engaged in
the same services which they had performed before war existed; and it pledges the military and executive power to
maintain the freedom thus bestowed. It is to operate therefore as a decree, or law, for the emancipation of probably half,
perhaps more, of the slaves in the States desig nated, not as
a punishment of rebels, for it operates on friends also,- not
because martial law ever reached them,- not because there
was in fact any subversion of the power and control of the
master during the war, - and not because such emancipation
5
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was necessary to the prosecution and success of the war ;
for the fact that they remai n in slavery until the military
operations have ceased, completely negatives any such "military necessity." 'l'he mjlitary necessity upon which you
and others rely to snstain the proclamation,- and under the
guise of which you and t hey are willing to surrender all the
liberties of t he freemen of the United States, and to subject
them to a most absolute military despotism, in order to subserve your favorite project of giving freedom to all the slaves,
- is thus shown to be either a careless or ignorant assumption, or a mere excuse, perhaps a hollow pretence, in some
instances I fear a wicked subterfuge;- by which those who
contend that the President may do anything which is required
by the military necessity,-and t hat he is the sole judge when
the necessity exists, and what i t requires, - hope to accomplish an unconstitutional purpose, at the risk of a final disruption of the Union and the formation of several Confederacies. Professor Patterson, of Dartmouth Coltege, in a recent
speech, accepting a Cong ressional nomination, pledged himself "to support, unconditionally," "every military necessity
to wltich lite constituted autlwrities niay deem it proper to reS<>rt, to crush t he rebellion." 'l'hat ·expresses the character
of the thing with admirable precision. The Professor understands it perfectly. The military necessity to proclaim t he
emancipation of all the slaves is not one w hich the rebellion
and the progress of the war have thrust upon t he Governm ent, requiring t he measure for t he public safety; but it is, emp hatically, a necessity to wlticlt lite constituted authorities ltave
deemed it proper to resort. It is not a necessity which has
pressed itself upon t hem, but one ,vhich they have soug-!tt out,
and are endeavoring to press into their service. It is, literally, a necessity which "knows no law." This is t he first
time, perhaps, in which a "necessity" has been drafted into
service, but we read of those w ho, in other times, "have
sought out many inventions."
And now for your argument in support of t he power to
emancipate the slaves, which you base upou the fact that
the Presi~ent may do certain other things in time of war.
The fact t hat th is emancipation by means of the proclamation is to operate in a great measure at t he close of the war,
0
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shows the wide and almost entire difference between this
exercise of power, and its exercise in those cases which you
put by way of illustration and argument, in the above extracts; in each of which, respectively, the power to destroy
and the power to seize and take, is a power to act during
the war, and one which cannot lawfully be exercised after
the cessation of hostilities, even upon an order issued prior
to that time. The President may "bombard cities,'J " burn
villages," and " mow down regiments of men in battle," in
the actual prosecution of a war ; but he can do none of those
things, nor order that they shall be qone, at the close of the
war. He, or a military commander, may seize private property, when needed for military purposes, while the war lasts;
he may "take cotton, provisions, forage, horses, and all sorts
of cattle, from the loyal as well as the disloyal," if the necessity of the hour require it, in the prosecution of the campaign; but he cannot perpetuate a necessity so to seize and
take after the war is over, even by an order issued before its
termination. Perhaps the military authorities may seize and
take provisions, &c., to supply the necessities of the army,
after the close of the war, until it can be withdrawn·; _b ut
the proclamation does not propose to t'!rnancipate the negroes, for the time being, to supply the necessities of the
soldiers. Your argument is a very perfect non sequitur.
By way of illustrating your own views, and the difference
between you and Dr. Cheever, -who I understand would
have the proclamation denounce slavery in good round terms,
as well as exterminate it, - you refer to the power of the
Mayor of New York, under the city charter and acts of
the Legislature; to blow up buildings in order to prevent the
spreading of fire. Now su ppose Mayor Opdyke, during the
time that a fire is raging, should order a few buildings to be
blown up to check it; and should further order, that as soon
as t he fire "vas subdued, a few squares more should be blown
up, by way of preventing the possible breaking out of another fire, at some indefinite time afterwards, do you not
think that the people would" blow him up?"
I g ive your "common sense" the credit of perceiving, by
this time, that you have been talking, very oracularly, about
matters respecting which you are profoundly ignorant; and
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that you have t hereupon made an exhibition of yourself according to the general rule in such cases made and provided.
The prosecution of the war for a restoration of the authority of t he United States, under the Constitution, should
command t he u ndivided support of the whole people of the
loyal States. A ,var for emancipation, which is in other
words a '\v ar for a revolution, cannot be supported, as such,
by those who have sworn to support t he Constitution, consistently with the oaths they have taken; and if it is placed
on that basis, t here must be divisions at the North, as well
as between the North and South. The infamous attempt to
charge ''disloyalty" upon all who do not support the proclamation, whatever countenance it has had in Senatorial
speeches, or Fraternity lectures, or " V iews from a Watch,
tower," will have no terrors for those persons who, faithful to
their Constitutional obligations, are attempting to avert the
ruin which is impending over us if we do not abide by the
Constitution.
In a remaining letter I will show, that if the United States
had, in this contest, all belligerent rights, and the President
alone had the right to make war, and might make the war
one of conquest, the President would not, even in that case,
have a Constitutional power to emancipate the slaves, in
seceding States, by a proclamation.
Yours, &c.
CAMBRIDGE,

Dec. 25, 1862.

TO THE REV. LEONARD BACON, D. D.
No. 6.

Srn, - It will not be deemed presumption, I think, to assume that it has been shown : 1. 'l'hat the United States
have not exercised all the rights of a belligerent in their efforts to suppress the rebellion, notwithstanding the contest
bas assumed the proportions of war, and cannot do so without conceding similar rights to the rebels; 2. That the President bas not alone the right to malce war ; 3. 'l'hat in the
attempt to subdue the rebellion, we have no right to make a

,
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conquest of the tenitory included in the seceding States, and
that we cannot, under the Constitution, make the war one of
conquest, unless we admit that the rebellion has severed
those States from the lJnion, so that they are to be regarded
and treated as foreign States.
In addition to this, it has been proved that there is no
"military necessity," and can be no such necessity, for an
emancipation of slaves which shall take effect only after the
war is over, and the rebellion subdued, - that a great proportion of the emancipation proposed by the proclamation must
be of that character,- and that your arguments in favor of
the proclamation, drawn from what may be done by military
power in the prosecution of a war, wholly fail of showing
any right on the part of the President to give freedom to the
slaves by a mere proclamation for that purpose.
I propose now to show, t hat even if the United States had
in this war all belligerent rights, - if the President alone had
the right to make war, - and if the war was a war for conquest, the President would have no right to emancipate all
the slaves by proclamation, or in any other mode.
Assuming the truth of all these propositions, the President
would have no greater power of emancipation than he has if
the war is regarded, as it ought to be, one prosecuted on t he
part of the United States to suppress the rebellion, and to
reestablish the authority of the United States, in active exercise, in those places where it is now practically inoperative
by reason of the rebellion. On such assumption, the war
must be canied on according to the ·general principles which
regulate war between two independent nations, but with all
Constitutional limitations to determine what power the President may exercise in such a war.
In order to determine whether the President may give
freedom to the slaves, even in such a war, it may be well to
examine a little more closely the nature and character of the
act by which the emancipation is to be effected. It is called
a " proclamation," but that designation does not serve to determine its character.
On the 22d of September the President proclaimed and declared that on the 1st of January, 1863, "all persons held as
slaves in any State, or any designated part of a State, the
5*
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people whereof shall then be in rebellion against the United
States, shall be tben, thenceforward, and forever free, and the
Executive Government of the United States, including the
military a nd naval authority, w:ill recognize and maintain the
freedom of such persons." T he forthcoming proclamation
is to designate the States or parts of States.
The emancipation of all the slaves within the territory
designated is to result from these acts, whether there has or
has not been any practical severance of the relation of master a nd slave in the cour::;e of the war. The proclamation is
of itself to be an act which gives freedom to all the slaves,
whether of loyal or disloyal masters, not only during the
time of tbe rebeUion, but ever afterwards, so that it becomes
legally operative, of itself, as a charter of freedom. It is intended to be an act of enfranchisement that the slaves may
plead hereafter in the courts of justice, if necessary, to establish their right to freedom. T he President is represented, in
a recent paragraph, as placi ng i t on that ground; and as
saying that this may be done as a war measure, "but not as
a measure issuing from the bosom of philanthropy." Such
is substantiallf your doctrine. The enfranchisement is not
to result from the operation of the war upon the slave, by an
actual subversion of the power of the master, but from the
proclamation of the P resident, subverting the power of tbe
master. In other words, the power of the President, exerted
through and by the proclamation, is, of itself, proprio vigore,
to give freedom, without aid from anything else, -without
any military operation connected w:ith it, - but by the mere
force of the President's declaration t hat it shall be so.
Upon what constitu tional or legal principle is this to be
sustained? What must be the legal character of this act,
supposing it to possess any legality?
It is clear that it is not a lawful act of the President, as
the chief executive magistrate of the United States. The
E xecutive department possesses no such power to deprive a
citizen of his property held under the laws of a State, The
chief executive magistrate of a State has no such power.
If Governor Andrew should issue his proclamation that the
title of the fifty-four thousand persons who voted agai.nst
him at the last election, to the property which they had pre-
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viously possessed, should, from the date, be annulled, and
held of no further force or effect ; and that any person who
should take possession of any of the goods of the said
" guerillas of Jefferson Davis," might plead hi~ proclamation
in defence of any suit which should be brought against him
therefor; the courts of Massachusetts would have no difficulty in disposing of his proclamation. But he has just as
much right to do this, as an act of Executive power, as
President Lincoln has to do an act of a similar character.
Such a change of title, or subversion of title, is not within
the scope of Executive power.
·
If it were claimed that the proclamation was in the nature
of a judgment or decree of emancipation, that would be in
its nature an exercise of judicial power. But the President
has no judicial power for such a purpose.
If it be said that it is a law of enfranchisement, which is
doubtless its true character, if it has any character, it is
equally clear that the President has no power to make a law.
All the legislative powers, under the Constitution, are expressly vested in Congress.
So far as I am aware, it is not contended that the President,
as President, can liberate the slaves.
But it is alleged that the President, as Commander-inchief, may, in time of war, liberate the slaves, although he
may not do it as President, by virtue of his powers as an
executive magistrate. That, I think, is substantially the
position. 'l'o t his I answer that the act of emancipation, so
far as it is not accomplished by the war itself, but depends
solely upon the proclamation, is, in its character, a law, that it is in its nature a legislative act, and that the objection
already stated applies in full force. The President has, as
Commander-in-chief, no legislative power. The emancipation in the West Indies, by Great Britain, was by Parliament,- in the District of Columbia, by Congress, - in the
Northern States, by law also.
Again: It is said, that although the President cannot
emancipate by a law, he may do so in time of war by a military order ; and it has been alleged that the proclamation,
although not in form, is, in effect, a military order. But if the
emancipation is not to be accomplished by the operations of
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the war itself, there is nothing gained to the argument by a
change of name, and calling the proclamation a military
order. "A rose by any other name would smell as sweet;"
and a skunk-c;ibbage, by any othe'l' name, wQuld not smell
any sweet.er. Calling it "a military order," under the war
power, does not even make it a measure of war, if it is to
operate of itself, - of its own force,- without military enforcement; as tbe proclamation must be designed to operate in all cases where the slaves remain under tbe control of
their masters until the close of the war. In all such cases, as
has been said, it effects nothing for the purposes of the war.
So far, it is in its nature and effect legislation, just as much
as if it was an act of Congress, passed in time of peace.
But let us test this in another mode. Suppose we treat it
as a " military order," by the Commander-in-chief, and lay
out of consideration your admission that the P resident's powers are strictly limited. Take the strongest case. May the
Commander-in-chief, in a foreign war, waged for the purpose
of conquest, by a military order which will take effect practically at the close of the war, liberate all the slaves of t he
enemy who have remained under the control and in the service of their masters up to that time ?
According to the approved usages of civilized nations, it
is not in the power of the Commander-in-chief of an i nvading army, by any military order, to change the laws of the
country invaded, or the titJe to private property there, not
even during the time of the war; except as the property
comes un<ler the actual control of the military force, in the
manner stated in my last letter. Still more clear must it be,
that he could not, by an order which had its operation after
the war had ceased, change the existing rights of property
under such laws. If the President, in a war with Spain,
should take the field as generalissimo, invade Cuba, and
order that all the property of the inhabitants should be con fiscated, and become the property of the Unit.ed States, and
the slaves be emancipated; the ce:!sion of Cuba, at the close
of the war, would not give effect to the order, either to pass
t he title of the property, or to emancipate the slaves of owi;iers who remained in full possession and control up to the
close of the war. It would not even pass the title of real
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estate of which the military force had been in possession.
Personal property seized and carried off by military force
during tbe war might not be recovered back.
I am aware tJmt the authority of Mr. John Quincy Adams
is invoked to sustain the proposition, that wber·e a country is
invaded, "the commanders of both armies have power to
emancipate all the slaves in the invaded territory;" and
these words of his, if separated from the context, may at
first appear to be broad enough to cover the proposition, that
the mere order of the commander, without more, will operate
as an effectual decree of emancipation. But that would be
preposterous. If the British commander who captured
Washington, in the war of 1812, had proclaimed the emancipation of all the slaves in the United States, do you suppose it could have been pleaded by the slaves as an effectual
emancipation, or that any right of the masters would in any
way have been affected by the "military order," standing
alone? That it could not have been the opinion of Mr.
Adams, that such order would have any legal operation beyond its actual execution by the military force - by martial
law- seems to be evident from the context, which serves to
show that he intended to say merely, that the commander,
by his actual military operations, might emancipate the
slaves. He was contending against an assumption that
Congress had no authority to interfere with slavery in any
way, and endeavoring to show that Congress might, in certain cases, interfere with it, both for and against. In the
course of the discussion, speaking of the war power, he
said : " When your country is actually in war, whether it be a war of invasion or a war of insurrection, Congress has power to carry on the
war, and must carry it on, according to the law:, of war; and by the
laws of war, an invaded country bas all its laws and municipal institutions swept by the board, and martial law takes the place of them.
This power in Congress has, perhaps, never been called into exercise
under the present Constitution of the United States. But when the
laws of war are in force, what, I ask, is one of those laws? I t is
this : that when a country is invaded, and two hostile armi(¾:> are set
in martial anay, the commanders of both armies have power to emancipate all the slaves in the invaded territory."

•
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Now, did Mr. Adams mean to assert, that upon the mere
invasion of a country all the laws and municipal institutions
of that country were swept away ;-that, for example, u·pon
the invasion of the United States, in the war of 1812, all the
laws and municipal institutions of t he United States were
swept away, and martial law substituted all over the country? Most assuredly, not! If he had, the assertion would
have shown him to have been a fit subject for the occupancy
of a madhouse. What he meant undoubtedly was, that so
far as the march of the iovading army extended, - so far as
the law of force became the governing power, - the laws
a nd the municipal institutions of the invaded country were
swept away for the time being, the martial law of the invaders taking the place of them. Even this would not be
true to the letter ; for if the invaders did not see fit to
apply their force to shut up the courts of justice, those
courts might still sit under the municipal law; suits might
be instituted, which did not involve any matter connected
with the hostilities; and valid judgments be rendered under the municipal law. Probably this is not usually permitted, where there is actual occupation by a hostile military
force.
If Mr. Adams's remark, in relation to laws and municipal
institutions, had this limited significance, it would seem that
his remark relating to emancipation, almost in ju..'l:.taposition
with the other, must have a similar limitation; and thus
limited I am not disposed to contest it, provided the commander of the i nvading force, having severed the relation of
master and slave, carries the slave beyond the power of the
master. Such was the nature of other cases, which have
been cited to support the broad principle, but prove nothing
more than this limited operation of martial law. In another
part of the same speech he remarked: "I say that military
authority takes, for the time, the place of all municipal institutions, slavery among the rest."
That the conquest of a country does not subvert its laws,
or the rights of property, until the conquering State sees fit
to change them, may be shown by abundant authorities. A
single extract from Chancellor Kent's Commentaries, will
suffice for the present p urpose.
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"It is a stittled principle in the law and usage of nations that the
inhabitants of a conquered territory change their allegiance, and their
relation to their former sovereign is dissolved ; but theh· relations to
each other, and their rights of property, not taken from them by the
orders of the conqueror, remain undisturbed. The cession or conquest of a territory does not affect the rights of property. The laws,
usages, and municipal regulations in force at the time of the conquest
or cession, remain in force, until changed by the new sovereign. There
is no doubt of the power of the sovereign to change the laws of a
conquered or ceded country, unless restrained by the capitulation or
treaty of cession. In the case of the Canal .Appraisers vs. the People,
in 17 Wendell's R. 587, Chancellor ·walwortb declared that, in the case
of a country acquired by conquest, no formal act of legislati~n is necessary to change the. law; the mere will of the conqueror is sufficient.
This is the case where the conqueror is in possession of the legislative
as well as the ~xecutive power; and until a nation or territory is
wholly subdued, the conqueror is only entitled, by the usage of nations, to hold it as a temporary possession, by military occupation
until the final issue of the conquest is settled by treaty, or by the competent Constitutional power. The principle of national law, as declared by the courts of the United States, is that conquest does not
give the conqueror plemtm dominium et utile." 1 Kent's Com. (6th
ed.) 178, note b.
I have omitted the references to several books of authority
cited by the Chancellor in the foregoing extract to sustain
his positions.
·
This may serve for the present to show that even in the
case of a foreign conquest, the President, if he were in the
field as Commander-in-chief, could not by a military order
emancipate the slaves, except through an actual severance of
the control of the master connected with it. He would not
be the " new sovereign" and has no power of legislation.
What is thus true in the case of a conquest of foreign territory must be true, much more clearly, if possible, where the
military occupation is of territory within the Union for the
purpose of suppressing a rebellion.
I had intended to make some remarks upon your distinction between " emancipation" and " abolition," and that between the right of the President t o emancipate, because it
will be the " means of crushing the rebellion," and a want
of right to emancipate because" slavery is wrong;" but this
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discussion has already extended much beyond the limits
which I anticipated when it commenced, and I am not disposed to add to it at the present time.
Trusting that in the next of your " Views from a Watchtower," you will not see that laywers and their logic are out
of place in the discussion of questions of Constitutional
law; and that your vision will be sufficiently clear to enable
you to " avoid the conviction" that those who oppose the
proclamation, "intend nothing else - than some concession
to the rebels, which shall either divide the Union, or subvert
the Constitution," and " are now willing to sacrifice the
Union for the sake of saving slavery;" I remain, Yours, &c.
CAMBRIDGE, Dec. 31, 1862.

TO THE REV. LIWNARD BACON, D. D.
No. 7.

Sm, - I duly received your note in " The Congregationalist" of January 16th, acknowledging the receipt of six letters
pu blished over my name in "The Boston Post," and addressed
personally to you; in which you say I that you propose to
study them with some care, and express a hope that in the
next number of " The New Englander" you may be able to
contribute somewhat to the elucidation of the matters which
I have invited you to discuss with me.
I shall look with interest for the results of that study, and
of your farther reflections upon the subject, more especially
as I am told that" The New York Independent" has al.ready
informed the pu blic, in anticipation of the forthcoming discussion in " The New Englander," that "Dr. Bacon hits hard
. a nd cuts deep."
In the mean time, permit me to commend to your particular attention some portions of my fifth letter, in which I
stated the differing views which different persons took of the
proclamation, and from which I make these extracts : -
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" Others are of opinion that the President, as Commander-in-chief,
may direct that wherever the army goes, and overcomes the power of
the rebels, the slaves shall be free; and they construe the proclamation as meaning no more than that; because, so far as the power of the
master is not overcome, it is clear that there can be no emancipation.
"I have no doubt that where the army carries successful warfare,
there martial law- the law of force - is, for the time being, the governing power for all the purposes of the war; and as the liberation of the
slaves- so far as that liberation is then and there a practical subversion of the power of the master - may weaken the power of the rebellion, it may be regarded as one of the means of carrying on the
war."
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"Upon the same principle, I do not doubt that the President, as
Commander-in-chief, or a commanding general in the field, may, in
the lawful exercise of hostilities, for the purpose of weakening the
enemy, invite the slaves to come within the lines of the army, and
assure them of protection, which may be made effectual by their removal beyond the subsequent operation of the municipal law."
" This is all the emancipation which can be had in the course of the
war; and if I could read the proclamation as extending no farther
than such emancipation, I should have no controversy with any one
who supported it. The opportunity to secure freedom in this way,
was, I think, substantially provided for before the proclamation, by
orders directing military commanders not to return slaves who came
within their lines."
" But those who have so vigorously urged 'the adoption of a policy'
and the issue of a ' proclamation of emancipation,' do not consider
this the limit of the emancipation which is to be effected by it. I
understand that you give it a much broader scope, as I believe you
are authorized to do. You say that it threatens the people in each
rebel State 'with the emancipation of all their slaves' and speak of
'the day when every slave under the rebel power shall be (so far as
our Government is concerned) irrevocably free;' and it is, doubtless,
for this reason that you call it ' the great proclamation.' It is, of
course, to gi1,e freedom after the return ofpeace, ( if it does not prevent
our arms from being victorious,) to slaves wlto have never been witliin
our power during the war."

"It is to operate therefore as a decree or law for the emancipation

of probably half, perhaps more, of the slaves in the States designated,
6
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not as a punishment of r ebels, for it operates on friends also, not
because martial law ever reached them, - not because there was in
fact any subversion of the power and control of the master during the
war, - and not because such emancipation was necessary to the prosecution and success of the war; for the fact that they remain in slavery
until the military operations have ceased, completely negatives any
such ' military necessity.' "

! twas upon the last construction, as its obvious intent and
meaning, that I contended t hat it was a usurpation of power,
mischievous, unwarrantable, and unconstitutional.
Now I have, very recently, been credibly informed, that
Mr. Secretary Stanton says not only that the proclamation is
a war measure, - a military order,- (that was said in the
outset,) but that its effect is merely to give freedom to the
slaves who come within tbe actual power of our army during
tbe war; and t hat when peace comes those who are not thus
set free will remain as slaves. And further, that if the people
of a State designated in the proclamation should lay down
their arms, submit, and send representatives to Congress, the
proclamation would have no effect in tbe liberation of the
slaves there. In other words, the Secretary now gives to it
precisely that construction, and measure of emancipation, of
which I said, " if I could rea-d tlie proclamati01i as extending
no farther than such emancipation, I sltould have no controversy
with any one wlto supported it."
How this is, you can probably ascertain by application at
head-quarters. Certain it is, that Republicans begin to be
quite sure that this is all that was ever intended by the procla mation, and to be very much surprised that any one should
construe it otherwise.
One thing, which I shall hope to learn from the forthcoming " New Englander," is, whether, if this is to be the official
interpretation and construction of this document, you will
still regard it as " the great proclamation." If this is all which
is meant by it, the axe w hich was to be laid unto the "root"
of the rebellion seems to have lost its edge, and to have become no better than any other poor tool for Abolition purposes. If this is all which is to be a'Ccomplished by the proclamation, the great jubilee of emancipation, in Boston, on
1he first of J a nuary, becomes a farce; and a qualifying sup-
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plement must be added to the hallelujahs which ascended
about that time, in various quarters (to say nothing of New
Bedford) on the allegation that freedom had been bestowed
on three millions of slaves.
If, on such a construction, you should come to the conclusion, that the proclamation is a very small matter for a proclamation, but a great matter of humbug, and a greater matter for mischief, I may be inclined to agree with you.
Yours, &c.
CAM.BRIDGE,

Feb. IG,

1863.

